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PREFACE
The issue of urban education has evoked a flood of books
indicating its failures and a freshet of essays proposing reform or
revolutions. But where are the studies of successful educational
institutions? The Autobiography of Malcolm X has shown that an
individual could overcome the disadvantages of miseducation
,
of
poverty, of discrimination, and of despair. Yet it left unanswered
the question of whether institutions might serve as a vehicle for
many persons to learn and to succeed in a society marked by racism
and economic competition.
The Westside Study Center was a community action organization
directed toward innovative responses to the problems of urban education
in Pasadena, California. This dissertation analyzes the establishment
and development of the Center from May 1965 through the fall of 1968,
during which time I served as Executive Director.
In addition to documenting the story of Westside, I have tried
to present an analysis of urban community relations. Westside Study
Center worked with persons in power and persons kept from power, with
Blacks and whites, with shy children and militant youths, with law
enforcement officers and concerned parents, with professors from the
California Institute of Technology and functionally illiterate adults.
Secondly, the Center illustrated the potential of New Careers
paraprofessional programs in the human services. Hard core unemployed
youths who showed promise were brought in as aides. As soon as
possible aides were promoted to assistants and as high as component
iii
directors. Most of the top Westside staff were enrolled in courses at
California State College at Los Angeles in order to improve their own
skills and to gain the degree necessary for professional employment.
Finally, I have tried to demonstrate in the story of Westside
the importance of a positive attitude for making people feel that they
can do something meaningful. That hope factor is essential for
education, as well as for jobs and community life. As a self help
organization, the Westside Study Center took people from a negative
attitude toward a positive attitude. The Center permitted people to
feel that they could do whatever their goals were. Perhaps the Center's
greatest success was in building the "hope factor."
I am grateful for the interest, energy, and time which several
persons gave in the preparation of this study. The opportunity to
undertake a research effort of this kind was provided through an
important experiment in education at. the University of Massachusetts,
a "revolution" in graduate school training led by Dean Dwight W. Allen.
I thank Dr. Richard J. Clark who served on my dissertation
committee and gave invaluable advice and support. Dr. Byrd L. Jones
offered his time, knowledge, and personal concern while the manuscript
was being prepared. Historian, economist, and educator. Dr. Jones'
expertise was invaluable. I am especially grateful to Dr. Robert L.
Woodbury, my major advisor, who encouraged me when the road seemed
difficult and offered his insights about urban education and the
politics of public policy.
I am indebted to the many people who read parts of the
manuscript and offered helpful comments: Tim Anderson, Larry Cohen,
iv
Carolyn Peelle, Royce Phillips, and Barbara Woodbury. I appreciate
the special diligence and concern of Judy Glazier and Janice Green
who typed the manuscript.
This thesis would never have been written if my friends and
colleagues at the Westside Study Center had not devoted many hours
to creating a viable organization and program: Co-founders and
Board Members A. Lionel Larsuel and Billy Williams; Board Members
Mrs. Barbara Blair, H. Burton Housman, Dr. Lester Lees, Emmett G.
Mickle, and Mrs. Miriam Pettier; and Staff Members Jack Allen, Tim
Anderson, Tommy Moore, Don Porter, Nate Sims and John White.
A.A.G.
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CHAPTER I
WESTSIDE STUDY CENTER: THE IDEA OF SELF HELP
In May 1965, Atron A. Gentry, A. Lionel Larsuel, Billy
Williams and other young adults established the Westside Study Center
as a self help organization for the Northwest Pasadena-Altadena area.
Located in the western end of the San Gabriel Valley of Los Angeles
County, Pasadena had grown from a retirement community founded in 1873
into an important city of 180,000 people, some fifteen per cent of
whom were Black. Home of such famous institutions as the Rose Bowl
parade and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena had more than smog
and freeway construction to suggest its urban status. In 1969 Pasadena
became the first school district west of the Mississippi to be sued
by the Justice Department for segregated schools. 1
Motivated by a desire to do something about the serious problems
in their community
,
the founders built an organization which survived
and grew into a model for successful urban education. The Center
became many things to many people: a place on North Fair Oaks Avenue
where local residents made more than a thousand visits a week; a group
of people, black and white, working together to make something happen;
1. See articles in The New York Times on Pasadena’s school
segregation suit: November 20, 1968, p . 28 ; April 7, 1969, p.33;
April 24, 1969, p.19; January 5, 1970, p.l; January 21, 1970, p.38.
1
2a coordinated series of programs emphasizing education and job
development reaching hard core poverty persons; and a vehicle through
which people could help others and help themselves.
2
Gentry, Larsuel, and Williams did not have to search out
people in need. In the census tracts around the Center one out of
every three families earned less than a poverty income. One out of
four adults was looking for a job. Washington Elementary School,
just a block away, enrolled less than ten per cent whites, reflecting
a serious separation of races in the school system. That system failed
with the many Blacks who dropped out before high school; and a majority
of Blacks who graduated could not read beyond the fifth grade level.
3
The Center staff knew the problems of discrimination and
deprivation first hand. Still overcoming their own miseducation in
California’s public schools, they hoped that they could devise methods
and attitudes to help children in Pasadena's schools learn basic
skills in reading and arithmetic. Still recalling with anger their
own fears and feelings of inadequacy imparted by bigoted and indifferent
teachers, coaches, and counselors, the founders hoped to motivate
2. Most of the material on Westside Study Center is from the
official and personal files of the Director of the Center, which the
author was for four years. Also see the bibliography for a list of
proposals and other descriptive material.
3. For a description of the area around the Westside Study
Center, see "Neighborhood Social Diagnostic Survey," prepared in
cooperation with the Community Redevelopment Agency of Pasadena,
April 1967.
3children with a fresh sense that difficulties could be overcome.
Tutoring on a one to one basis could break through some fears about
learning while providing enough additional practice in reading and
arithmetic. A little personal attention, the Westside volunteers
hoped, might overcome the failings of the school system and enable
more children to gain an education.
Although the Westside Study Center in Pasadena became one of
the few successful community action agencies, the founders later re-
called their innocence, inexperience, and naivete. With some books
on spelling and phonetics and some time on weekends and evenings,
Gentry, Williams, and Larsuel were going to change Pasadena's schools
and their community. They had enthusiasm, sincerity and a sense
that they were testing an important means for overcoming racism and
poverty. The real test came when sincerity and desire proved in-
sufficient. New attacks, new programs, new approaches had to be
found to reach a goal of making the Center a vehicle for self help
in Northwest Pasadena. The staff would have to learn and grow in
order to cope with larger dimensions of the problems.
In three long years, Westside became a viable organization
because it grew and built upon its established strengths. From the
first, the staff had an unusual dedication to their primary task of
helping people. Incorporating that dedication into its own organization,
the staff operated on a New Careers basis. Hard core unemployed
youths who showed promise were brought in as aides; as soon as possible
aides were promoted to assistants and as high as component directors.
4Many of the Westside staff were enrolled in courses at California
State College at Los Angeles in order to improve their own skills
and to gain the degree which would expand their employment opportunities
A second source of strength depended upon a coordinated
approach so that Westside' s educational and communications services
both supported and gained support from its job development and
counseling services. For example, when a youth telephoned from the
courtroom after an arrest, Westside staff would speak on his behalf.
Most youths needed help rather than a sentence in juvenile court.
Usually municipal and juvenile judges would assign the youth to the
Center rather than to jail. Then the staff would talk over the
youth's problems, perhaps arranging for special tutoring and for
his return to school. Often a lack of money had caused the initial
problem, and Westside located part-time work. By providing a sense
of support and hope in all areas, Westside could affect someone's
life.
A third key to Westside's success was its broad range of
active supporters—unmatched by any other agency working in the city.
Westside staff worked with men who had more items in their arrest
sheet than words in their active vocabulary; and the staff met with
business men and city officials in sensitivity sessions. Tutoring
drew functional illiterates, elementary school children having
difficulties assimilating the white culture of their reading texts,
high school drop-outs attending special classes in order to earn a
general education diploma, workers seeking special vocational skills,
5and college-level Negroes seeking special training in writing.
Business men, school board members, and retired citizens stopped
by to see what was happening. Often they volunteered their services.
Fourth, whether the Study Center had outside financial
support or relied upon the staff to volunteer their time, Westside
had convinced poor people in the Los Angeles area that it offered
more than a meaningless promise and another referral. Similarly,
business men had learned to respect the work of the Center and its
continued interest in the persons placed in jobs. Such organizations
as the courts, the city police, and city schools asked Westside for
assistance in dealing with poor people.
Strongly motivated to make their organization survive and
grow, committed to their dream of creating a vehicle for growth and
change, the staff at Westside built learning into their whole
operation. Never content to repeat past successes, they continually
faced situations and problems requiring new skills, new contacts, and
new risks. Using paraprofessionals wherever possible, experienced
staff trained new aides. The efficiency of the organization was
never defined in terms of lessons tutored, jobs found, or counseling
sessions conducted. Those tasks had meaning only if they helped
people to survive and find hope in the system. That purpose gave
a unity of staff and meaning to the Westside Study Center as it
sought on-going support and a chance to affect Pasadena.
62. An Historical Sketch
For approximately one year, the Center operated as a
volunteer tutoring and counseling service. Organized by young
black adults, Westside started with the idea of helping children to
read and spell. Volunteers from the community and from local high
schools and colleges were recruited to tutor children and young people
on a one to one basis. Initially the Study Center focused on reading,
arithmetic, and writing. Too many black children were turned off
by the standard
"white-oriented'' curriculum of Pasadena's schools.
As more persons came who needed help or who had skills to
volunteer, Westside accepted a larger task. Finding part time
employment might keep a youth in high school, where his problems had
less to do with learning than with his own self concept. Sometimes
the key lay in a discussion with the school's counselor who was not
communicating well with a child. Often Westside staff talked with
parents in an effort to enlist their help in supporting a child's
study. Many times the staff had to work with a tutor who knew
calculus but could not cope with black children. Soon a large
proportion of time by the staff went toward arranging, mediating, and
counseling between other volunteer tutors or agency officials and
tutees
.
The need for a paid, full time staff became increasingly
apparent. Organizing volunteers required as a minimum a place and
a telephone as well as files. But more importantly, without some
permanent staff there could be no effective follow up and no real
7development o£ staff contacts and knowledge. In order to carry out
its intent of helping people by using the resources of the co»unity,
Westside had to achieve a base of support for Its operations. It
needed an opportunity to demonstrate its skills and Its ability to
improve education in Pasadena.
During the summer of 1966, the Center received summer "crash"
funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0)
. With a grant
of $50,000 the Center proved that its pioneering work in education.
New Careers and job development, counseling, community services,
and communication could be expanded into significant and inter-related
programs. More than 70 jobs, for example, were found for adults in
the Pasadena area during the summer/
For a short time, Westside Study Center became more than a
perpetual demonstration project, a token community action program.
It had action, charisma, success, and a noticeable impact on the
community. But Federal funds ceased on September 30, 1966. The Center
had to remain alive on hope and small private donations. A favorable
evaluation prepared by the Los Angeles Community Action Agency
provided small comfort.
5
4. See Thomas A. Anderson and Harry Krasnick, "Westside Study Center
Youth Development Program Final Evaluation Report," Economic and Youth
Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles, November 1966, Appendix B:
Job Development Component Statistics. See also Westside Study Center
Master Proposal, Job Development component and pages 84-92 of this text.
5. Anderson and Krasnick commented that Westside had "...begun to
have a marked effect in solving the problems of alienated, poverty
youth in Northwest Pasadena-Altadena. " "Westside Study Center," p.2.
8Nevertheless, the Center did not fade away after that sunder.
A low-cost volunteer tutoring program continued with over forty
tutors and eighty students. Most of the staff who had worked during
that summer stayed on without funds. The spring of 1967 was a
building period; new projects and new programs were developed on a
shoestring. Local business pledges and private support grew rapidly.
Again In the summer of 1967, crash funds became available
from 0E0. But $10,000 provided only enough to operate a job development
component. That component employed youths as aides in teams to
contact local firms and ferret out employment opportunities. Usually
Westside staff counseled both prospective employees and employers in
pre- and post-job training. With their experience from the previous
summer, Westside aides established good working relationships with
many Pasadena firms so that counseling could reach people before on
job problems had accumulated. As a result, Westside placed more
than one hundred persons in meaningful and continuing jobs.
6
Because of that success and because of growing support within
the Northwest community, Pasadena's Commission on Human Need and
Opportunity (PCHNO) supported a similar program fpr the three month
period from October 1 to December 31, 1967. During that period,
sixty-seven placements were made. In the meantime, private donations
and volunteer time supported the other components of a rounded
6. See proposal to PCHNO by Westside Study Center for 1967
contained in official files of the director.
9community action agency. Indeed, only the leverage in the conmunity
from those other programs enabled Westside to have enough clout so that
federal money was reluctantly granted to Westside. Hence the PCHNO
finally granted $40,000 for the 1968 year, which modestly put Westside
on an annual basis for the first time.
As of the summer of 1968, then, the Westside Study Center
operated from three sites and six small buildings in the poverty area.
Its work fell into four main functions: (1) job development, (2) educa-
tion, (3) community services, and (4) public relations. Each component
had a director with several aides and Neighborhood Youth Corps clerk-
typists under his guidance, as well as several volunteers who did
work ranging from typing addresses to providing comprehensive
management consultation. Westside' s expenditures ran about $15,000
per month, including $2,000 per month from pledged private donations.
Those figures, however, grossly understated its impact, which was
augmented by the many unpaid volunteers who helped Westside not
only at the Center buildings but also in the city.
Only the job development component had federal support, and
it had achieved an astonishing record of success because it had
worked with the other supporting services. Tutoring at all levels
remained the most common meeting ground where Blacks learned about
the Center as a place to seek help. In the tutoring program,
people from outside and inside the immediate community came together
to make a meaningful contribution of their time and skills. Those
two components which reached hard core poverty persons that other
10
agencies did not wish to see gave Westside an undeniable role in the
community. Also, they gave Westside its best hard evidence of per-
formance and effectiveness for outsiders who asked for documentation
and evaluation.
Westside* s other two components proved equally important for
making an impact on Pasadena. Community services developed a close
and effective relationship with the Pasadena Police Department and
with municipal and juvenile courts. During early 1968, Center staff
members counseled more than 164 individuals. In most cases those
persons were released by the courts under the recognizance of the
Center. That service won respect and support from a part of the
community not reached in a helpful way by any other agency. The
public relations component coordinated the growing activities—speeches,
basic encounter sessions, open forums, and news releases-
—through which
Westside communicated with both whites and Blacks.
Probably the most encouraging signs in the spring of 1968
were indications of a growing awareness among business men that job
training and job development for ghetto residents were more than a
government boondoggle designed to prevent riots and minor civil
disturbances. Spurred by military demand for the war in Viet Nam,
businesses needed laborers. Significantly, the Pasadena Independent
Star-News ran a special series of seven articles which presented
the Center's story to a larger audience. In conjunction with that
series in the local paper, a Business Advisory Committee undertook
to raise funds by seeking on-going monthly pledges from local
11
businesses. Despite gratifying indications of support, such business
contributions provided less than one seventh of the Center's
.odest
budget.
7
By fall 1968, three and a half years after its inception,
Westside had become a viable agency. In part that meant its reputation
its support, and its acceptance by major elements of the Pasadena
community were established. Spokesmen for Westside were interviewed
by reporters when sampling opinions on local events. In part, that
change meant Westside could take fewer risks with people and programs
than it had one year earlier. It had greater leverage, but it had a
responsibility to avoid mistakes.
The staff deserved great credit for having survived, grown,
and established a community action agency against the odds, but their
organizational style had to change. Volunteered time was not always
dependable time. From the beginning, the Center had relied less
on extrinsic rewards of money and job experience than upon intrinsic
rewards such as mutual loyalty and support, and a humane and open
attitude toward others’ strengths and weaknesses. After the summer of
1966, there was the charisma of black Pasadenans making an indifferent
and often bigoted city take notice. Finally, and most important for
the growth of the Center, there had been the key staff’s commitment to
7. Pasadena Independent Star-News series of articles on the
Westside Study Center, February 18-25, 1968.
the idea of self help and the hope factor in motivating change. 8
3. The Idea of Self Help
12
From the start, the young black Pasadenans associated with
Westside wanted to do something positive with their own lives as well
as for other people. Self help was a complex notion since it had to
come from within themselves before it could be sold as an idea to
other Blacks. It involved the subtle problem of creating the power
to control at least a part of one's own life and a part of one's own
community— a power which lay at the heart of individual freedom. And
it involved a cruel paradox. From the point of view of many in the
ghetto, anyone who had boots with straps had already escaped. How
could he relate to those who needed help?
A satisfactory answer depended upon the staff operating one
step ahead of those who came for assistance. Recognizing the
importance of trust as a prerequisite for effective communication.
Center staff talked about their recent struggles to learn. Tutors
who gained the confidence of a child in trouble at school created an
atmosphere of hope and positive direction which proved effective
despite a lack of resources and professional training. On the other
side, tutors often learned a great deal. As they talked to the tutees
they discovered that difficulty with learning often sprang
8. For a discussion of the role of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards,
see Douglas McGregor, The Professional Manager (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1967), especially Chapter I.
13
from insensitive teachers.
Hie idea of self help was as simple and as complex as anything
about the Center. The staff had to arouse hope and motivation-an
illusion of power. Then, students who thought they could not learn
and tutors who thought they could not teach would have a chance to
discover their power to help themselves and others. For black males
to admit they could not read meant admitting stupidity and failure.
Self help allowed tutors and staff to tell of their own hang ups,
fears and failures and build trust. They saw themselves as being
in the process of overcoming those difficulties. By emphasizing
change, Westside helped create an atmosphere of hope which won an
indispensable motivation.
Also self help depended upon a staff which ranged from youth
aides holding their first jobs to component coordinators who had
considerable experience but lacked college diplomas for a professional
position. The staff—including the director, associate director,
coordinators and most aides were either in school or planning to
return. The Center used ideas of New Careers and paraprofessionals
before the terms became known. Unless the staff was helping itself
to learn and helping itself by advancing from aide to assistant and
from coordinator to well-paying jobs in industry, that staff could
scarcely sell the concept of self help to others.
9
9. See Frank Riessman and Arthur Pearl, New Careers for the Poor :
The Nonprofessional in Human Services (New York: Free Press, 1965) and
Robert Reiff and Frank Riessman, "The Indigenous Nonprofessional: A
strategy of Change in Community Action and Community Mental Health
Programs," Community Mental Health Journal Monograph Series, 1965.
14
Hie resulting turnover of stuff and the many hours devoted to
on the job training as well as part-time classes sometimes produced
a frustrating confusion about the internal administration of the Center
But that inefficiency was more than compensated for by the Center’s
rapport with people who came to it for help because they feared the
bureaucratic procedure of other agencies. In addition to its own
staff, Westside provided training opportunities for many Neighborhood
Youth Corps aides. While they lacked experience in typing and running
a telephone switchboard, they knew about poverty and the need for
self help programs.
The contrast with established welfare and service agencies
went further than an atmosphere of openness. Most agencies assumed
that their clients lacked power. The first reaction, and often the
last, of such white-dominated groups as the Chamber of Commerce or
the American Friends Service Committee was to call for a new
survey. Their help came in the form of current statistics about the
age of housing, the incidence of arrests, or the bitterness expressed
by unemployed workers. By implication, Blacks and poor people could
not even grasp their own plight. Thus, any alleviation must come
from the established power blocs, who would
—
presumably—mend their
ways when told about the extent of deprivation and discrimination.
As a result, most official agencies fostered and supported
one of the damaging aspects of a typical ghetto pathology. Repeated
frustrations created a helplessness and anger which turned many
black youths against trying to make it. Why struggle in a system
15
which prevented success and which could not be destroyed? Before
people could put their energies and thoughts into learning to read
or holding a meaningful job, they had to see some chance to win, some
avenue through which they could get ahead. Without a vision of
possible control over their own future, self help was meaningless.
Yet most agencies, most police officers, most welfare workers, most
church groups, most city officials, most school teachers in Pasadena
implied in their tone and their actions that Blacks could not control
their own lives without assistance from a white world which was
paternalistic at best and often hostile. 10
Self help, when supported with enough tutoring, enough
counseling, and enough encouragement so that individuals could see
some positive accomplishments, worked to change both actions and
attitudes. As the Director commented in an early interview in the
Independent Star-News
,
"We have been able to see people start to help
themselves and when they do this they are no longer so-called indigent
people; they are no longer in a poverty state. They have a point of
direction." 11 In personal terms, the changes were often dramatic.
A youth who often expressed bitterness and anger at conditions became
10. For useful descriptions of a ghetto pathology, see Paul
Jacobs, Prelude to Riot (New York: Random House, 1968, 1968); Kenneth
B. Clark, Dark Ghetto (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); and Kenneth
B. Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty (New
York: Harper and Row, 1969).
11. Pasadena Independent Star-News
,
October, 1966, in personal
files
.
16
interested and concerned while tutoring a third grader with reading
or spelling.
Thus self help, a traditional American ideal for the white
population, became a key ingredient in the black revolution of the
1960’s. As James Farmer summed up the experiences of the Civil
Rights Movement: "The masses of Negroes who are now involved in the
movement have achieved a measure of spiritual emancipation with which
Lincoln s Proclamation could not possibly have endowed them." The
key toward overcoming "the Negro sense of inferiority" and gaining a
sense of legitimate identity lay "only in the midst of purposive and
realistic effort in America." By sitting in lunch rooms and by boy-
cotting stores and enduring a thousand humiliations to little children,
Southern Blacks gained dignity and pride which did not result from a
Supreme Court order.
The idea of black self help played an important part in the
thinking of nationalist groups such as the Muslims or US. Without
money and the resources for major changes, black organizations had to
establish their identity in terms of a different life style and
different cultural norms. Even more strongly than civil rights groups,
nationalist organizations emphasized their reliance upon black
supporters. Westside Study Center, operating in the conservative
and middle class society of Pasadena, gave its own twist to self
12. James Farmer, Freedom When ? (New York: Random House),
p. 80.
17
help. But the idea and ideal provided a common meeting ground such
that both civil rights groups and nationalists remained friendly
toward Westside and its goals. 13
Indeed, so essential was the idea of self-help to the Black
community in the mid-1960's that another organisation in Los Angeles
paralleled Westside's course in many respects. Founded by Lou Smith,
Bob Hall, and Bob Bailey, "Operation Bootstrap" began in October 1965
in South Central Los Angeles. Initially, "Bootstrap" focused on job
training. The organizers asked for borrowed space and equipment and
encouraged volunteers to offer instruction on various machines and in
various skills. Self help made such pragmatic and ad hoc arrangements
not easy but workable. Soon "Bootstrap" included a variety of educa-
tional and community relations programs in part because they supplemented
job training and in part because they represented interests of some
volunteers.
The important thing, Bob Smith emphasized, was not programs per
se, but a change in attitude among participants. By attempting to
13. See also Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York:
Bantam Books, 1965), especially chapter 6 on non-violent direct
action. For example E.U. Essien-Udom in Black Nationalism (New
York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), p.360, described the
Muslim approach as follows: "Substantive freedom, a people's style
of life-material, cultural, moral and a sense of human dignity—
cannot be bestowed upon people who do not want it, and if they do,
are not prepared to help themselves and make the sacrifice necessary
lor its attainment; they must help create the conditions for it."
18
improve conditions for people in South Central Los Angeles, Smith
thought, "we're opening up new lines of communication; we're forcing
people to talk to each other-people from different economic levels-
to get them to understand that there are other kinds of people and
that each one has something to offer to the other." Self help and its
related changes in attitudes established a common ground for starting
such communication. 14
Yet the strategy of organizing the Westside Study Center
around the idea of self help also involved two sorts of problems which
were not typical of most community action agencies and which often pro-
duced internal tensions. Because no one at Westside could admit to
failure, the Center often worked with hard core persons who had few
connections to the world of steady work and a legal income. Thus at
least part of the staff had to maintain familiarity with a street life
of hot goods, marijuana and pill peddling, and much more. At the
same time, if the staff succeeded in helping itself, the Center had to
grow and take on larger and more difficult tasks. Those tasks
involved connections with city officials and local business men who
often expected an appearance of efficiency and respectability.
The pressure for growth came from several directions. Since
racism had a pervasive impact upon the lives of Blacks, a serious effort
14. Bob Bailey and Lou Smith, "Operation Bootstrap" (an
interview conducted by Hallock Hoffman) Center Diary: lj6 (publication
of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions by The Fund
for the Republic, Inc., Santa Barbara, Calif.), January-February
,
1967,
p. 38.
19
to overcome discrimination required an attack at many levels. Tutoring
might encourage enough learning to pass another grade and eventually
to complete high school. Still, many young Blacks with high school
diplomas could not find any work, much less an open ended job.
Different persons had different criteria for success. A major dis-
couragement in one area often destroyed a lot of assistance and
motivation in other areas.
In addition to that pressure to help in different ways people
who came to the Study Center, the staff wanted to expand its own skills
and impact. If basic encounter sessions heightened racial awareness and
perceptions for small groups in Pasadena, perhaps that method could
work for a major manufacturer. If line foremen and middle management
became aware of the feelings and perceptions of new black employees,
then Blacks would find it easier to hold jobs with advancement
possibilities, and the general employment picture might improve. 15
Always there was the search for more money and more staff to do more
things and make a greater change in Pasadena. By involving school
teachers and other members of the black middle class, Westside
15. Westside Study Center staff started encounter sessions for
businessmen as the result of early program experiences in job develop-
ment and community forums. Businesses hiring hard core employees found
Westside' s techniques valuable. In 1968 Westside staff participated
in seminars on sensitivity techniques at Richard Farson's Western
Behavioral Sciences Institute and the Center contracted its services
in basic encounter to the Human Development Institute in Atlanta,
Georgia.
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substantially moved to unite the poverty youths and the established
middle class Blacks who shared Pasadena's ghetto.
The pressure for expansion led to a growth during three
difficult and exciting years from a weekend tutoring service to a
full scale community action agency. That growth, that involvement
in the real problems and real people of Pasadena, helped to create
an excitement about Westside which made itself felt to everyone who
came. People associated with the Center recalled a hundred stories
and incidents to illustrate and convey that charisma. For example
a Caltech professor happily tutored kids—although he might easily
have earned more than $1,000 per day by consulting in his field.
Everyone remembered the day the summer program set up a free tour of
Marineland for one bus load of children and then sent two buses and a
station wagon. The calvacade waited at the gate until Marineland
i
decided it would rather admit everyone than choose which bus to
send back.
But no story in print conveyed the flavor of people doing
things which they wanted to do but had been afraid to try. It was
arranging for a young Black spokesman from US to talk circles around
Caltech professors, not so much to demonstrate militancy as to prove
that a Ph.D. did not bring expertise in all areas. It was non-
qualified people and a non-supported organization trying things and
succeeding.
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4. Westside's Staff—"Young, Gifted and Black"
Westside Study Center could not have succeeded without its
staff which combined a career ladder, a substantial loyalty to
the idea of self help, and a dedication to making Westside work. In
a typical day, everyone on the staff was both training others and
being trained himself. Each job combined the challenge of new, untried
tasks and the consolidation of experience; each task combined learning
and teaching. A staff member had to play many roles, being personal
and professional to a wide variety of people within one day, adopting
"different strokes for different folks. "16
Walking into Westside, one might have found such a combination
of people as teenage girls working as Neighborhood Youth Corps aides,
members of the directing staff engaged in everything from professional
counseling to sealing envelopes, mothers from the community tutoring
children, Caltech professors moving furniture, and a wealthy matron
from the Board of Directors filing papers. "A spirit of enthusiasm
permeates the Center," a reporter noted. "It is fun to be there, and
the seriousness of purpose never quite crowds out the clubhouse
atmosphere." Since everyone from time to time tackled tasks beyond their
imagined capabilities, since everyone could make mistakes and did,
Westside people shared a special trust and togetherness. Lionel
Larsuel said, "There's a groovy interchange. Every level of the
16. Popular song "Everyday People," by Sly and the Family Stone,
subtitle from a dramatic work by Lorraine Hansberry.
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community is there, from the richest to the poorest, trying to make
opportunities for [people]. That’s what makes it meaningful. "17
The sense of fun and capacity for hard work among the staff
was illustrated by the story of the making of the film "Black Anger"
for the Human Development Institute (HDI) in Atlanta, Georgia, a
subsidiary of Bell and Howell. 18 in Spring, 1968, the Director of
Westside was contacted by HDI while he and the Job Development
Coordinator were in Washington on a fund-raising trip. He telephoned
Westside telling the staff to take a plane to Atlanta the next day.
He asked Lionel Larsuel, Jack Allen, Tommy Moore and Don Porter his
top level coordinators, to come. He also asked John "Junior Boy"
White, an ex gang leader, one of Westside’s hard core staff who was
rising in the ranks to an assistant coordinator’s position.
The excitement about the trip is explained on many levels,
the telephone call gave little time to plan or worry. It was the
first time Westside was called upon to demonstrate its charisma
nation-wide in a large group. For most of the staff it was their first
trip to the deep South. For John White, in particular, it was his
first exposure to the world of businessmen and jet planes— it was, in
fact, his first ride on a plane.
Before leaving, the staff outfitted John White from their own
17. Pasadena Independent Star-News
,
February 23, 1968.
18. See film "Black Anger" in the official files of the Director.
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pockets with the clothing needed to complement the Westside Study
Center Jackets—deep maroon jackets with the emblem of the Center on
the pocket; an hour glass and the words "Time is running out." The
jackets were proudly worn by staff at Westside who held positions of
responsibility and had demonstrated their loyalty to the Center. It
was indicative of the importance of the trip that John put on the
uniform with the rest, and that they made sure he was able to portray
the Westside image. He also obtained an attache case, a symbol, in a
sense, of his new image of responsibility.
Everyone boarded the plane with mixed feelings of excitement
and anticipation. They were about to enter Westside in a significant
competition, they were about to make a film, and they were going to
Atlanta for the first time. When the plane took off, Junior Boy
held on to the seat for dear life, a seat he could have pulled loose
with his size and strength.
When the group arrived in Atlanta they shared many funny and
frightening experiences traveling around the city. Two weeks earlier,
Martin Luther King had been assassinated in Memphis. A group of young
black males, traveling together in matching jackets, communicating
unity and fun, were a strange sight to Atlantans. At several restaurants
they were asked, "Do you sing?" The group was aware of the irony of
the image they portrayed, given people's prejudices and expectations.
The Westside staff was not there to sing, but they were there
to make a movie depicting black rage. Their role was to convey to
whites the black experience, by their image and their words, so that
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communication could take place about white attitudes and perceptions.
At HDI, John White took on the role of the Director's eyes
and ears. He sized up what he was there for, he figured out the
"rules," and he made sure everyone else in the group stuck to the
rules. By the time he got on the plane to return, John White was a
"professional." He sat down on the plane, coolly opened up his attache
case, and proceeded to read his papers.
After the Atlanta experience, John White was never the same.
He was no longer programmed for jail; he had different needs. He had
had a taste of another world, a world larger than the few square
blocks he had ruled in Pasadena. He wanted a share of success in the
larger world he had glimpsed. Soon after the Atlanta trip, he became
Assistant Coordinator for Job Development at Westside.
For the rest of the staff, the experience was not so much
totally new as the first opportunity to compete on a national level.
As a part of their national campaign to hire more minority workers
,
the
National Alliance of Businessmen had contracted with Human Development
Institute to make a film to sensitize middle management to minority
workers. To make the film, "Black Anger," HDI had invited five
groups of black young men from Los Angeles, Roxbury, Chicago, Detroit,
and Philadelphia.
For Westside* s staff, making the film was an opportunity to
demonstrate skills they had learned at Westside in encounter group
techniques and in developing jobs. Also they had a chance to express
some of their own frustrations and those of others, revealed
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in tutoring and counseling hard core unemployed adults.
If successful, Westside's part in making the film and
competing for the contract would offer the opportunity for national
exposure and would open new doors in funding. In the offing was the
possibility of a sub-contract to direct other programs in HDI's
sensitivity training.
No one on the staff had the traditional credentials of a
professional, the B.A. degree. At age thirty, Jack Allen, Head of
Community Services, and the oldest coordinator, was a junior at Cal
State, Los Angeles. Assistant Director, Lionel Larsuel, age twenty-
six, had tried college programs three different times, each time
meeting with typical frustrations and "turned off before being turned
out." Obviously bright and articulate, Larsuel had found in Westside
a chance to use his talents and to realize his concern for alienated
black youth. Both Don Porter, in charge of public relations, and
Tommy Moore, educational component director, managed to combine a
heavy load of classes at California State College at Los Angeles with
raising families and directing their components at Westside. The
Director, himself, completed his bachelors degree concurrently with
his responsibilities at Westside.
Young, ambitious and talented Blacks, Westside staff "stole the
show" by working together in the film "Black Anger." They remembered
the serious purpose of the film and its possible consequences for them,
but they knew how to break the tension and not to be too up tight about
the possibility of failure. What they were doing was not only new but
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supposedly impossible.
Although Westside combined the experience and supportive
assistance which opened doors for John White and others, sometimes
Westside could not counteract the impact of a pervasive system of
distrusts, discrimination, and deprivation. One of John White’s friends
on the staff, for example, ended in jail. Called Duke in one
sociological study, he illustrated the effects in personal terms of
a society which left bright, active youths without access to legitimate,
respectable paths for advancement. Although those standard examples
used to illustrate the pathology of ghetto life have created a
skewed impression, Duke's case did represent a possibility open to
many others, for the escape from jail was often narrow.^
Born in 1948, Duke never experienced a stable family life
whi-C-h he could both emulate and draw upon for support in dealing
with school and classmates. His mother, unmarried, had arrived from
Arkansas shortly before his birth. He had a younger half-brother and
older half-sister. His natural father had lived in the Northwest
Pasadena area and had provided some support for Duke, first under
court order and later voluntarily. Duke knew his father and liked
him, but spent little time with him. The three most influential
members of his family were his mother, his maternal grandmother, and
his maternal great grandmother, with whom he lived.
Duke's mother, grandmother, and great grandmother worked as
19. Pat Sutton, "Duke: A Study in Deviance," (an unpublished
case study).
27
domestics from the time he was a small child, and they had never been
on welfare. "Cousins" in the neighborhood looked after him when he
was younger and Duke returned from school to an empty house. He often
defended his younger half-brother, a high school drop out on probation
whose problems troubled him, and his sister, who attended business
college and worked in an office.
Although kept in schohl for twelve years, Duke could barely read
a newspaper. He had no skills readily sellable on the job market,
and his physical strengths had little value in a day of machines.
At the age of thirteen he had his first formal confrontation with
the police. His arrest record included marijuana possession, destruction
of property, suspicion of robbery, and an alleged assault on a police
officer; and he had been tried for attempted murder. Duke recognized
his problem with his temper and that he quickly leaped to the support
of his friends. He felt a gun was a necessary protection.
Duke spent his leisure time in hustling—he never held a job
in the terms defined by the middle class. For a time he was paid by
the police to act as a control on the behavior of his friends. He was
viewed by the police as a "ring leader" and by his Juvenile Probation
Officer as a "unique guy" and a "natural leader."
Duke came to the Westside Study Center with the help of a
"cousin," a respected businessman in the Negro community. He became
a community relations assistant at the Center in November, 1967. The
job, which paid $1.50 an hour, four hours a day, was the first time
he had worked where he was expected to be some place on time to do
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certain specified things.
His job involved him with the police and the courts in a new
way. Parents of young people arrested in the area would call the
Study Center, and the Duke among others would go to jail and to the
police to talk to and about the prisoner and his alleged offense. In
the case of juveniles, he would go to court with the youngster and
tell the judge the results of the investigation he had made regarding
the boy s friends, his contacts in the community, and the possibility
of his staying out of trouble in the future. Often, the juvenile courts
would release the boy into Westside's custody.
Duke took pride in actually changing judge’s minds about the
disposition of a youngster. Duke and others like him learned to talk
like a lawyer. In the case of young adults, Duke would make a
similar report to the lawyer who was going to take the case. (The
Center had five attorneys who took cases). In addition, Duke made
a financial investigation of the client and recommended to the attorney
how much should be charged, based on ability to pay. Duke was proud
that the lawyer would believe him and base the fees on his recom-
mendation.
In spite of his competence and usefulness at Westside, Duke's
troubles with the police did not end. His reputation, friends, and
previous behavior pursued him. In 1968 Duke was arrested and convicted
and is now serving a sentence of five years to life.
Pasadena’s Dukes demonstrated the need for Westside Study
Center. It's failures and successes had to be measured by the
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difficulty of the task and the effort involved. By what standards
could one compare John White's story with that of his friend. Duke?
Westside had a staff that could reach people like John White
and Duke, whose lives were balanced precariously between success and
defeat. They could empathize because they had been abandoned by public
institutions and white society. In Westside, they mobilized their
talents and frustrations—making a film, tutoring children, raising
money, speaking in court, running encounter sessions. Young, gifted
and Black, their successes proved the waste and neglect perpetrated
by a racist society.
CHAPTER II
PASADENA A CASE OF URBAN NEGLECT
Westside Study Center made no sense except as a response to
Pasadena's persistent failure to provide equal education and opportunity
for its poor and minority citizens. As Jack Allen, coordinator of
community services, told a local newspaper reporter, no one at Westside
wanted a permanent organization. "There should not have to be a
Westside Study Center," he added. 1 If the Pasadena Unified School
District had provided meaningful education, if local business firms
had employed qualified minority workers, if the city had made its
Northwest region feel a part of a larger community rather than ghetto,
then Westside would not have existed.
The facts about the ghetto—defined by a lack of power and
money relative to the rest of Pasadena-Altadena-were on the one hand,
clear enough. In the area around the Center, about three persons in
four were Black and one in six Caucasian. Three in five households
had an income of less than $5,000 per year. Three families in ten fell
below the officially defined "poverty level" in 1966. For children,
the chances of experiencing poverty were higher, since two thirds of
the families (145 in one survey) with five or more children were in
the poverty category. About one in five families depended upon some
1. The Pasadena Independent Star-News series on the Westside
Study Center, February 23, 1968, p. A-l.
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form of public assistance (See Figure 1). One in four in the nineteen
to sixty-five age bracket reported themselves unemployed. Two in five
adults had not finished high school. No minority person had held an
elective office in the city or school district.
2
Few Pasadenans outside the Northwest area, on the other hand,
recognized a problem. At least they had seen little reason for concern
prior to the 1965 rioting in South Central Los Angeles. Most white
Pasadenans did not know where Watts was, and they certainly would
have denied—had the thought occurred—that Pasadena had a growing ghetto
along North Fair Oaks Avenue. They were far more aware of the denial
of civil rights in Birmingham, Bogalusa, and Selma than of discrimina-
tion in Watts, Compton or Pasadena.
^
Making the Westside Study Center work depended upon a clear
sense of reality; more precisely, it required a flexible understanding
of the realities perceived by many different groups and a skill in
communicating across those barriers thrown up by different perceptions.
First, the Westside staff had to know and accept the inarticulated
fears, impressions, reactions, and hopes of the people living in
Northwest Pasadena. Second, the staff had to negotiate with the
2. See "Neighborhood Social Diagnostic Survey," prepared in
cooperation with the Community Redevelopment Agency of Pasadena, April
1967. Figures are based on fire census tracts with a 1960 population
of 27,328 along North Fair Oaks Avenue
3. See Jerry Cohen and William S. Murphy, Burn
,
Baby
,
Burn !
The Watts Riot (New York: Avon Books, 1966), p.12.
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established powers of the city who seldom recognised the existence
of a relatively deprived community in Northwest Pasadena. How
could Westside encourage practical remedies from a city which did
not want to see or understand the condition of thousands of Blacks?
There was indeed a thick sheet of plate glass between the
Blacks and the white majority; as W.E.B. DuBois has eloquently
described:
It is difficult to let others see the full psychological
meaning of caste segregation. It is as though one, looking out
from a dark cave in a side of an impending mountain, sees the
world passing and speaks to it. . . . One talks on evenly and
logically in this way but notices that the passing throng does
not even turn its head, or if it does, glances curiously and
walks on. It gradually penetrates the minds of the prisoners
that the people passing do not hear; that some thick sheet of
invisible but horribly tangible plate glass is between them and
the world.
4
Thus affluent white Americans had effectively filtered out sounds of
protest from frustrated Blacks who endured discrimination and depriva-
tion.
By the 1960’s Pasadena presented a classic case of urban
neglect. A majority of voters saw no problem with their city. Mean-
while housing and public services deteriorated in the Northwest area
and schools with a large black population taught less and often spent
less. Pasadena changed from a white, middle class residential
community into a city much more typical of urban America.
4. W.E.B. DuBois, Dusk of Dawn (1940), pp. 130-131, as cited in
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1964), p. 680.
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1* Pasadena—The Crown City
Pasadena, home of the California Institute of Technology and
the Rose Bowl, was by 1960 a city with a favorable reputation and with
little willingness to examine its worsening public services and pros-
pects. Dominated by white, wealthy, self-satisfied property owners,
Pasadena had a rapidly growing black population. Attracted by pleasant
residential streets, available housing in the older Northwest area,
and new openings for unskilled labor in the electronics industries,
Negroes had moved to Pasadena from the South and from central Los
Angeles. Blacks made up one in twelve Pasadenans in 1950, one in
eight in 1960, and more than one in five in 1969. Yet those citizens
scarcely counted when outsiders associated Pasadena with little old
ladies in tennis shoes, magnificent parades, and good schools.
In I960, as in 1950, Pasadena was by and large controlled by
a combination of old families and downtown merchants who ran the city
unofficially through considerable informal agreement and the support of
the two local papers. Rather unconsciously, residents spoke about
Pasadena as a united and active community when ttey actually meant a
small group of men. As the reporter David Hulburd had noted in 1952,
"Pasadena, with its traditionally conservative background, was (and
still is) dominated, in the main, by a group of influential downtowners,
most of them with big real-estate interests, whose social center was a
place called the Overland Club and who pulled a great many strings
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in the operation of the city." 5
Civic pride was fostered by the international fame of its
New Year's Day celebration, by its department stores which attracted
shoppers from the western end of the San Gabriel Valley, by the
Pasadena Playhouse, by a much-used public library system, and by a
highly-regarded City College. Looking north—on smogless days,
residents saw the Mount Wilson Observatory. Just to the east in
Arcadia, racing took place at the Santa Anita track. A few blocks
south in San Marino stood the famed Huntington Library and Gardens.
TVo newspapers, the Star-News and the Independent
, regularly supported
"Downtown Pasadena," the Chamber of Commerce, the Tournament of
Roses Association, as well as the largest silent partner in Pasadena's
progress— the California Institute of Technology and its off spring,
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
The traditional power groups in Pasadena clung to its reputation
as a good place to live. In 1939, a major study had ranked Pasadena
first among American cities in "General Goodness of Life." Then,
a winter resort and retirement community, Pasadena had many orange
groves which added an air of rural space to its many urban advantages.
Its natural beauty and pleasant climate encouraged people to live
there who could support civic enterprises as well as many privately
supplied amenities. Connected with Los Angeles by street railway
5. David Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1951), p.119.
36
or a long drive, Pasadena had not yet lost Its distinctness In the
smog and general sprawl of Los Angeles.
6
But Pasadena could not long remain unaffected hy the enormous
growth of population and industry in the Los Angeles basin during
and after World War II. With the opening of the Pasadena Freeway
in 1940, many persons had built homes in the orange groves and vacant
land in eastern Pasadena and Altadena. That influx of population,
nearly all white and employed in middle class jobs in Pasadena or
Los Angeles, generally acquiesced to the government both formal and
informal of the old "Downtowner” group, although their interests more
resembled those of their suburban neighbors in Arcadia and Glendale.
Most things which Pasadenans pointed to with pride depended
largely upon the organized, but voluntary, support of businessmen
and philanthropists. Caltech, the Huntington Library, the Art
Museum, and the fast-growing Ambassador College testified to the
wealth of contributors. The Tournament of Roses Association, the
Foothill's Community Chest drive, the Pasadena Beautiful Association
relied upon the organized good will of citizens. Pasadena's
Congressional representative, H. Allen Smith, represented well the
conservative and anti-federal biases of his constituents. While
periodically capable of reactionary diversions, few white residents
6. See Dr. Edward L. Thorndyke, Your City . Also see Robert W.
Oliver, An Economic Survey of the City of Pasadena (Pasadena, California:
The Pasadena Chamber of Commerce, Hay 1959), p.39.
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had any serious complaints about their city in 1960.
Nevertheless, the bases for conflict had existed for more
than a decade. The Downtowners with real estate interests as well
as homeowners disliked any public service which threatened a rise in
property taxes. Thus, as Hulburd had noted, "much as they welcomed
new industry as a means of bringing in new revenue, they abhored
the social changes new industries create
—
particularly the influx of
nonwhites who must be housed, fed, their children educated, and
absorbed into the community . "7
No longer simply a winter resort for the wealthy and the
retired and yet more than a bedroom suburb for Los Angeles, Pasadena
confronted contemporary urban life with a tradition and an entrenched
ruling group peculiarly unable to meet the city's problems.
In 1959 Pasadena had a minority population concentrated along
Fair Oaks Avenue. Twenty years earlier there were about 3,000
Negroes in a population of 75,000 living in "established communities
of servants of the rich." When other Negroes moved in after World
War II they joined those pockets strung out along Fair Oaks Avenue,
in the valley below the big estates along Orange Grove Avenue (the
street shown on television for the Rose Parade) . As Hulburd had
noted in 1950, the area was "hardly substandard. It could never be
called a slum."®
7. Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena
,
p.120.
8. Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena
,
p.9.
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Indeed, Pasadena attracted many middle class Blacks from
central Los Angeles. As a past board member of the local chapter of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples
commented: Negroes found in Pasadena M a good middle class community
with a sizeable segment of fairly affluent black people. It was a
nice community in which to live and it had good schools." In most
cases the new residents worked in Los Angeles. Typically, both
husband and wife held jobs. They hoped Pasadena would prove a good
place for their families. They worked hard, shopped in Los Angeles
carefully cared for their homes, and avoided public activities in the
city. That pattern contributed to the general "invisibility" of
Pasadena’s black citizens for many years.
^
Certainly white Pasadena had a difficult time recognizing
any difference in their city as a result of growing minority population.
As early as 1950, the presence of minority group pupils had started
affecting Pasadena's schools, but not in major ways. In 1948, the
Board of Education had hired a new Superintendent, Willard Goslin,
then president of the American Association of School Administrators.
Thirty months later the Board requested Goslin' s resignation. Most
opposition rested upon charges of progressive education by persons
who identified Karl Marx, John Dewey, and Joseph Stalin as enemies
of their way of life. Yet one factor in an overwhelming defeat of a
tax increase measure came from opposition in areas which feared new
9. Comment cited in Dorothy Townsend, "Pasadena's Crown City
Image Tarnished," Los Angeles Times
,
Section B, April 27, 1969.
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school boundaries would place them in a district with Blacks. As
the President of the Realty Board delicately phrased his objections;
"the proposed change in toning will have a definite effect on property
values .'*10
The Goslin controversy and the subsequent defeat of the tax
increase foreshadowed the conflicts which would paralyze effective
action in Pasadena as it changed from a homogenous population to a
city of conflicting interest groups: retired versus young; middle-
class versus poor; Black versus white. Wealthy civic leaders pulled
out in dismay as Pasadena rapidly took on the characteristics of
modern urban dilemmas.
When people shared many interests— often true in white
middle-class suburbs almost any political organization could obtain
consensus upon the quality and allocation of such services as fire
and police protection, water and sewage lines, schools and recrea-
tional facilities. But no government system has worked well to
compromise opposing wants. And as a result, modern cities have built
public enterprises through various expedients : charismatic leader-
ship, civic corruption, major propaganda campaigns, or political log-
rolling among elected representatives of interest groups. Undoubtedly
those expedients have not successfully overcome a persistent
tendency toward under-allocation of publically-financed goods and
10. Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena
,
p.80.
services .
H
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In one sense, cities have urban problems precisely because
their heterogeneous populations have such diverse interests as to
make public services a source of conflict rather than civic consensus.
Business men desire zoning requirements and street patterns different
from those sought by residents. Young families want more parks,
schools, libraries, and recreational programs for children than do
retired workers. In the United States, such class and economic
differences have been compounded by a pervasive white racism. 12
Pasadena had some distinct advantages, however, for creating
support from a majority of tax payers for civic services. A large
tax base meant a low tax rate. The city collected substantial income
from a sales tax paid in part by non-residents who shopped there.
The city spent more than twenty-five times more for police protection
than for welfare. (See Figure 2 for a breakdown of taxes, and
expenditures.) But Pasadena's tradition of civic leadership had
never included its black citizens—middle-class or poor. The dialogue
11. For an economist's approach to collective activities, see
Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken, 1968). For the point
about under-allocation of resources for public services is made most
clearly in Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget Is Too Small in
a Democracy," in Public Wants and Public Needs
,
edited by Edmund S.
Phelps (New York: Norton, 1962), pp. 76-95.
12 . Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p.10.
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that might have preceded effective compromise never reached across
racial lines.
2. Pasadena’s Discovery of a Housing Problem
In 1958, The Pasadena Chamber of Commerce contracted with the
Stanford Research Institute for a social and economic survey. By
then, many businessmen recognized signs of change in their city. As
the SRI report noted: ’’Pasadena is a city in transition. It is,
however, a city which has the potential to deal successfully with
three major problems: a shortage of land, growing obsolescence in
certain residential and commercial areas, and the increasing number
of low income families in the older part of the City.” 13 Phrased
more bluntly, vacant lands, new residences, and new industries on the
east side no longer assured prosperity to the city. Older areas
on the west side attracted lower income and minority groups who
required a different kind of public service than Pasadena had pre-
viously provided.
Although the author of the report shared many liberal
attitudes, Robert Oliver had no positive suggestions for Pasadena’s
business community which would at the same time help the people
living in the Northwest community. Unable to confront directly the
issue of most Pasadenan’s commitment to maintaining a white community,
Oliver phrased the change mainly in terms of housing: "The prime
13. Oliver, An Economic Survey
,
p.5.
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symptom of residential obsolescence is that low-income families
and individuals now live where middle-income families used to live.
Middle income and high-income families and individuals are being
pushed farther away from the heart of Pasadena." 1^
As Oliver noted, most cities had difficulty in halting the
shift from older residences to recognizable slum conditions, "it is
possible," he wrote, "that the strict enforcement of health, sanitation,
and building codes and the enforcement of zoning ordinances may prevent
the development of slums." That possibility, however, ignored the
probability that older people and minorities would move in. "If the
people moving into the areas are not accustomed to maintaining and
improving property, the deterioration is accelerated, blight is
likely, and slum conditions may follow. "1-5 And a slum offered little
economic incentive for renewal, which apparently meant the city should
discourage low income residents. Accordingly, the solution for
obsolescent housing lay in enforcing housing codes and possibly a
community redevelopment agency. (The possibility of seizing a chance
to cooperate in a viable integrated society was left unstated.)
That focus upon the age and condition of housing—an emphasis
which soothed qualms about mentioning the racial make-up of Northwest
Pasadena— did not encourage a recognition of poverty and discrimination.
Southern California slums were not crowded tenements but many blocks
14. Oliver, An Economic Survey
,
p. 11.
15. Oliver, An Economic Survey
,
p. 106.
of small frame and stucco dwellings crowded on small lots. Acute
heat or cold seldom brought obvious physical discomfort. Nor did
Pasadena's black population include many cases of hunger and disease
for those who demanded pathological conditions before recognizing a
problem. As late as 1965, ostensibly liberal and concerned adults
denied that Pasadena had a ghetto, although they regularly drove along
Fair Oaks Avenue. Unemployment, underemployment, moonlighting,
families with several breadwinners—those were the major manifestations
of the quiet struggle to survive and to get ahead.
Poverty became a problem long before it became the abject
condition that all too many citizens associated with slums. In Pasadena,
poverty appeared in the lawns of dust and tufted Bermuda or wild rye
grass. It appeared in the absence of fresh paint, adequate furnishings,
newspapers, magazines, and books. Poverty meant rats and other rodents
and neighbors with similar problems. It meant old cars, no cars, and
waiting for rare and slow public transportation. It meant fewer public
services such as washing the streets and trimming roadside palms. But
poverty—which lay behind the deteriorating housing described in
official reports—did not leap forth and proclaim itself.
That purposive confusion encouraged by labelling a problem as
"poor housing" while meaning "poor Blacks" passed mainly unnoticed to
most white Pasadenans because the minority population lived in distinct
sections whose decline had little immediate effect upon property values
in east Pasadena. Originally, Pasadena’s black population—mainly
domestics— lived near Orange Grove Avenue for the convenience of thexr
employers. As the Influx of black families from Los Angeles
increased,
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the unofficial policy of the city to ghettoize the area around Fair
Oaks solidified.
Common practice among realtors, in conjunction with the
mortgage policies of local banks, maintained first Marengo, then
El Molino, and finally Lake Avenue as the eastern boundary of the
visible ghetto. The northern boundary progressively pushed north
into Altadena, the unincorporated county area between Pasadena and
the mountains. Some apologists explained residential discrimination
as a result of the lingering effect of restrictive covenants—
a
common feature of deeds in Pasadena before the Supreme Court declared
them unenforceable. (Until 1969, the Board of Realtors had denied
such discrimination. At which point an officer announced that
realtors had "grown up, turned around completely." For example, he
added, "If an owner today says don't show my house to Negroes, we
walk away from the listing. "^)
That geographical distribution, of course, made possible a
host of minor forms of public discrimination, although Pasadena had
experienced little difficulty about integrating the seating in movies
and maintaining a reasonably equal system of parks. The major group which
worried about the impact of a declining neighborhood was the merchants
along Colorado Boulevard who were already plagued by inadequate parking
spaces and old buildings. They wanted to push the black neighborhood
further north, but they wanted to do it without a lot of publicity and
16. Townsend, "Pasadena's Crown City Image Tarnished."
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without hurting Pasadena's reputation as a good place to live and to
shop.
From the point of view of downtown businessmen and property
owners, the problem seemed peculiarly difficult. If they ignored
Northwest Pasadena, the area might deteriorate into a slum. If the city
government acted to keep up public services, if the city banks and
real estate brokers encouraged Negroes to buy houses, if schools
maintained quality education and integrated districts, then they could
anticipate an accelerated trend toward black population. White
Pasadenans were even less willing to consider that possibility.
Apparently, their optimum strategy lay in making life difficult for
Blacks while officially denying the existence of a ghetto or slum,
since such a belief might detract from Pasadena’s reputation and its
property values.
Such a strategy might have worked. Most cities have consistently
provided worse services for black citizens than for whites. Whether
planned or by accidental design, in the 1960's Pasadena shifted its
ghetto northward away from the central business district. Through
various changes in zoning, through the Pepper Redevelopment Agency,
through the routing of the Foothill Freeway and extension of the Pasadena
Freeway, events combined to shift the center of Negro population north
of the new east-west freeway route. Altadena became largely integrated,
though no one could tell if that were merely a transitional step.
Federally-financed redevelopment served as the instrument for
moving Blacks out of many central areas. In January, 1961, Pasadena
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City Board of Directors devised a plan called the Pepper Project
to provide what seemed to be low cost housing for poor Blacks and
minority groups. (See Figures 3 and 4.) From that time, all
development on the land was halted by law. Homeowners, primarily
Blacks, could not renovate or privately sell their homes, but had to
await the City’s "fair offer."
The plan was initially adopted under Ordinance No. 4677 by the
Pasadena City Board of Directors on September 11, 1964, and was amended
in 1968. In the interim period, primarily 1964-65, most of the land
was bought and immediately cleared, providing residents with no
housing until the promised low-cost quality housing would be com-
pleted. I?
Many private dwellings were acquired through eminent domain.
Four out of five lots were owner-occupied. (See Figure 4.) Most
of the homeless citizens, according to a special series in the
Pasadena Eagle
,
were forced to move into other ghetto areas or out of
the city entirely. The relocation problem was made worse, said the
Eagle
,
by the low amounts paid for the property in relation to housing
costs elsewhere in the city. 18
In order that the project might qualify for federal assistance,
the plan was also devised to function as an Urban Renewal Plan. A
federal grant of 3.88 million dollars was received towards the project.
The city was to contribute 1.43 million (But as of the spring of 1969,
18. For a critical view of the Pepper Project see the series in
The Pasadena Eagle
,
April 19, May 17, June 1, June 14, July 6, 1968.
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an investigating team from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development reported that no more federal funds would be forthcoming
until the city made a first and significant payment." "We've never
run into anything like this before," a HUD agent said. A news reporter
paraphrased him as saying. "It could.
. . shake up the whole theory
of federal-community cooperation in urban redevelopment. "19)
Building on the land began in 1969, eight years after the land
had been frozen and four to five years after the land had been cleared.
Only in 1970 were the first series of buildings completed. In the
meantime, for eight years, business and home development had been
halted on lower Fair Oaks Avenue. During that time, not surprisingly,
the center of the Black population moved northward and eastward.
Most of the inconsistencies in the Pepper Project's goals
and means were no mystery to ghetto residents. As one study noted,
Pasadena's first and, so far, only redevelopment project had to
"contend with a mountain of suspicion on the part of the Negro.
But Blacks had no say in how the city ran its affairs; and for most
white residents of Pasadena, the critical issue was not obsolescence
of housing but the racial make-up of schools.
19. Townsend, "Pasadena's Crown City Image Tarnished."
20. Ben Magubane and Anthony Ngubo, Report of the Pepper Area
Research Project (Pasadena, California: American Friends Service
Committee, September 1965), p.l.
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3. Schools Face Racial Imbalance
Plainly the quality of public schools made a difference to the
people who chose Pasadena for their home. As early as 1963, for
example, one realtor estimated that rental properties earned
$500 more a year in the white Hamilton district than in the integrated
McKinley district although both neighborhoods were largely white
and close to Caltech. In 1958, real property in Pasadena had an
assessed valuation of $318 million. It was taxed $10.40 by the city
and $59.30 by the county per $1,000 of assessed value. The schools re-
ceived $35.60 of the county tax—a characteristic figure for similar
cities in California. Those taxes had maintained a first rate
school system.
In the 1958 report, Oliver had noted that "one of the strong
points of Pasadena was the relatively high level of education attained
by its citizens." At that time, there were three school districts
with one board and one superintendent. The elementary schools
included Pasadena, Altadena, and some unincorporated areas. The high
school district added on La Canada and Sierra Madre, while the junior
college district went further to include Temple City. In 1958,
twenty-seven elementary schools served about 15,000 pupils, seven
junior high schools held 8,000, two senior high schools served nearly
5,000 enrolled full-time and another 10,000 adults in various
extension programs. Furthermore, Catholic schools enrolled about
4,800 students. 21-
Signs of trouble still lingered from the bruising fight over
21. Oliver, An Economic Survey , p.87.
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Willard Goslin in 1950, but Oliver judged it "probable that the
excellent national reputation which had been enjoyed by Pasadena’s
school system prior to 1948’ s [would be] restored." As evidence,
Oliver cited that in 1957 71.9 per cent of the graduating class from
John Muir High School and 72.1 per cent from Pasadena High School
enrolled in a college or university. In national tests Pasadena
placed 30.3 per cent of its students at or above the 90th percentile
level and 87.1 per cent at or above the 50th percentile. The John
Muir High School, which ten years later would be the first high school
in Pasadena to have a majority of black students, enrolled nineteen
members of its graduating class of 1958 in Stanford University
(the largest number from any one high school, public or private,
in the United States). ^2
Nevertheless, some of the impact of white Pasadenans’ reluc-
tance to send their children to school with black Pasadenans was
already apparent in 1958. As Oliver had diplomatically noted, "In
the minds of some of the Pasadenans interviewed during this study,
the increase of minority races in Pasadena is causing a problem in
that wealthier families, particularly those with children, are leaving
those school districts having a preponderance of minority races."
For the next decade most white Pasadenans knew someone agonizing over
the decision to leave an integrated district for east Pasadena or
for a neighboring city. Generally they were correct in judging the
22. Oliver, An Economic Survey , p.90.
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quality of schools to be declining; and invariably their decision to
move speeded up that process. 23
At that time, only Cleveland (81 per cent Black), Garfield
(51 per cent)
,
Jackson (26 per cent)
,
Lincoln (66 per cent)
,
Madison
(26.5 per cent), and Washington (52.8 per cent) elementary schools
enrolled more than twenty per cent Blacks. Only three other elemen-
tary schools bore the name of a former President: Roosevelt (19.5
per cent Black), Jefferson (7 per cent), and McKinley (6.3 per cent).
Only Franklin, with 9.6 per cent, intervened in the roll call of
presidents among elementary schools with more than two per cent Black
children. Among six junior high schools, Washington with 45.6 per
cent Negroes and Roosevelt with 24.1 per cent led the list. Among
the three high schools in 1958, Continuation had 14.1 per cent,
John Muir had 13.7 per cent, and Pasadena High School (PHS) had 3.0
per cent. 24 (See Figures 5 and 6).
Although those numbers meant that most schools were integrated,
Pasadena presented a classic case of de facto segregation. Three out
of four black children in Pasadena attended an elementary school in
which they were a majority. At the same time, most white children
attended schools with no, or with less than one per cent, Blacks.
23. Oliver, An Economic Survey
,
p.88.
24. Data taken from "Pasadena City Schools Racial and Ethnic
Distribution of Enrollment," Pasadena Department of Research, Pasadena
City Schools, October 1966.
Figure 5.
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Percentage of Negroes enrolled in schools by years
ELEMENTARY JUNIOR HIGH
1958-59 1963-64 1966 1958-59 1963-64 1966
Cleveland (1)
*
81.1 87.0 94.4 Washington (a) * 45.6 67.1 71.1
Washington(2) 52.8 81.2 87.4 McKinley (b) 8.7 21.2 19.5
Lincoln (3) 66.2 74.8 78.7 Eliot(c) 0.2 9.7 18.4
Franklin (4) 9.6 59.3 73.2 Roosevelt (d) 24.1 14.6 18.2
Jackson(5) 26.0 54.7 68.2
Madison(6) 26.5 36.8 55.3 SENIOR HIGH
Edison(7) 0.2 28.9 45.7
Audubon (8) 0.8 20.4 37.5 1958-59 1963-64 1966
Roosevelt (9) 19.5 28.6 37.0
Garfield(lO) 51.5 43.4 36.5 Continuation (I) 14.
1
23.1 43.1
Loma Alta(ll) — 3.7 15.1 Muir (II) 13.7 26.
4
32.6
Altadena(12) 0.1 4.4 13.5 Blair(III)
— 21.8 22.1
McKinley (13) 6.3 18.0 9.2
*Key to location on map.
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Figure 6
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AREAS
Caucasian
1958-59 1963-64 1966 1958-59
Negro
1963-64 1966
Allendale (24)* 93.0% 87.8% 87.2% 0.3% 0.2% —
Altadena (12) 99.5 92.9 76.4 0.1 4.4 13.5
Arroyo Seco(25) 98.4 98.9 98.8 — — —
Audubon (8) 97.7 66.0 48.1 0.8 20.4 37.5
Burbank (20) 100.0 98.3 97.5 — 0.4 2.0
Cleveland(l) 1.8 0.8 1.9 81.1 87.0 94.4
Don Benito(17) 99.4 98.7 93.6 — — 3.9
Edison(7) 98.0 64.9 46.5 0.2 28.9 45.7
Field(21) 94.0 94.5 91.3 — — 1.0
Franklin (4) 76.9 24.5 13.9 9.6 59.3 73.2
Garfield(lO) 11.1 17.0 26.2 51.5 43.4 36.5
Hale(15) 98.4 90.5 87.9 — 1.5 5.0
Hamilton (2 3) 93.3 92.1 84.3 — 0.8 0.2
Jackson(5) 41.8 12.2 8.1 26.0 54.7 68.2
Jefferson(18) 86.3 82.5 76.9 7.0 4.2 3.9
Lincoln (3) 8.1 4.1 4.2 66.2 74.8 78.7
Linda Vista(16) 99.6 98.4 98.0 — 4.7
Loma Alta(ll) 100.0 94.0 78.1 — 3.7 15.1
Longfellow(14) 96.2 88.1 81.3 2.0 4.7 6.3
Madison(6) 59.8 44.1 24.6 26.5 36.8 55.3
McKinley (13) 88.0 75.4 70.5 6.3 18.0 9.2
*Key to map on Figure 5 and rank in percentage of black students in 1966
Figure 6 (continued)
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1958-59 1963-64 1966 1958-59 1963-64 1966
Noyes (22) 100.0 99.7 99.2 — — 0.3
Roosevelt (9) 64.9 58.3
'
54.3 19.5 28.6 37.0
San Rafael(26) 99.6 98.5 98.1 — 0.4
Sierra Madre(27) 93.6 93.8 94.1 —
Sierra Mesa(28) 95.7 96.4 96.4 — __
_
Washington(2) 31.3 9.6 4.9 52.8 81.2 87.4
Webs ter (19) 99.8 97.1 94.2 0.1 1.1 3.7
Willard(29) 95.6 93.7 93.8 0.1 0.1 —
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT IN JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL AREAS
Eliot(c)
*
99.3% 84.7% 74.6% 0.2% 9.7% 18.4%
Marshall (e) 97.1 92.2 88.3 1.0 1.9 4.9
McKinley (b) 80.3 61.8 61.6 8." 7 21.2 19.5
Roosevelt (d) 53.7 75.6 68.2 24.1 14.6 18.2
Washington(a) 40.6 15.0 10.7 45.6 67.1 71.1
Wilson(f
)
96.7 95.9 93.0 — 0.1 0.2
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT IN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL AREAS
Blair(III) * (First year 64-65) 62.9% 60.8% 21.8% 22.1%
Muir(II) 80.7 63.3 54.4 13.7 26.4 32.6
Pasadena(IV) 92.5 91.1 86.6 3.0 2.5 7.9
Continuation (I) 71.8 63.7 48.1 14.1 23.1 43.1
*Key to map on Figure 5 and rank in percentage of black students in 1966.
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Five years after the Supreme Court declared de jure segregation
illegal, Black parents in Pasadena saw the irony of de facto segregation
increasing unchallenged.
A landmark ruling in 1963, the Jackson Case, challenged the
legality of de facto segregation and set a new precedent for the
State of California and the nation. Previously, the State Counsel
and County Counsel had argued that school districts could not take
steps to remedy racial imbalance directly because that would involve
"ratio or quota plans based on color." As the Coleman report later
commented, "attempts to achieve racial balance were violations of
the Constitution and. • • race could not be considered as a factor
in school districting. Apparently previous racial concentration,
aided by districting, had not been so regarded, yet attempts at
desegregation were. "25
During the summer of 1961, the Board of Education had
denied a request from Jay Jackson, a thirteen year old Negro, that he
be transferred to Eliot Junior High School because Washington was
segregated "and therefore inferior." In September, the parents with
the cooperation of Sam Sheats
,
a lawyer who conceived of a brilliant
new approach, filed suit against the Board. Two years after the
Jackson’s initial request, the California Supreme Court established
a clear guideline for "affirmative integration" where residential
25. James S. Coleman, jet al.
,
Equality of Educational Opportunity
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 480-
483.
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patterns effectively segregated neighborhood schools." "Where such
segregation exists," the Court ruled, "it is not enough for a school
board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory conduct." Indeed,
the right of an equal opportunity for education and the harmful
consequences of segregation require that school boards take steps,
insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in
schools regardless of its cause. "26
That decision has been the most important legal defense
against the increase of de facto segregation in schools in California.
For Pasadena, it meant that no new schools could be built that did
not decrease overall segregation. What happened, in fact, was that
Sheats successfully challenged in court school bonds which did not
conform to the Jackson ruling, and white voters in East Pasadena
success fully
t
voted down school bonds which did not conform and would
increase integration.
While the Jackson case was in the courts, the Board had
attempted to balance enrollment at the high school level—where the
problem was less severe and the commitment to neighborhood schools
less strong. On Halloween of 1962, the Board and Superintendent
Walter Jenkins appointed a Citizens-Staff Advisory Committee on
Redistricting. After five months, that Committee presented a plan
for the high schools. John Muir High School was 77.4 per cent
26. California Supreme Court Decision, June 27, 1963, as cited
by Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity
,
p.480.
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Caucasian and Pasadena High School 92.6 per cent. That imbalance
would assuredly increase if the Negroes currently enrolled in the
feeder schools stayed in the same part of Pasadena. At the same time,
La Canada, the community northwest of Pasadena-Altadena and formerly
^ P^^t of the Unified School District, had withdrawn. That decision,
based largely upon their objections to integration at Muir, hastened
the process of racial separation.
The numbers game has always played a major part in debates
over schools and integration. Was the relevant figure for racial
imbalance 77.4 versus 92.6 per cent or was the pertinent test the
16.4 Negroes in Muir compared to the 2.2 per cent in PHS? Should
the redistricting committee count on the construction of a third
high school which was needed but which had fallen substantially
short of the necessary two-thirds vote in a bond election two years
earlier? Was the key fact the 38.1 per cent predicted enrollment of
ethnic minorities at Muir or the 29.5 per cent Negro enrollment?
Or was the crucial issue that four out of five Negroes in high school
were assigned to a deteriorating school?
On April 2, 1963, the Committee submitted its recommendation
for redistricting which would tend to equalize both size and racial
balance (20.3 per cent in Muir and 6.3 per cent in PHS). Two weeks
later, at the next meeting, "it became clear that considerable
opposition was developing in neighborhoods scheduled to be switched
from the Pasadena to the Muir attendance zone." In response to that
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pressure, the Board focused attention upon the possibility of building
a third high school before having to redistrict. Parent opposition,
particularly from the Noyes Elementary School in eastern Altadena,
built a case that distance had counted for less than race. 27
Again and again parents voiced their resentment at being the
pawns in the Board of Education's attempt to integrate schools.
Unvoiced was their belief that Muir was, or soon would be, offering
an inferior education along with its integrated classrooms. (Unvoiced,
because to admit such a belief would raise the question of why the
city provided an inferior education for areas with a large minority
population.
)
In the end. Plan B, as the Committee's work came to be
labelled, won little enthusiasm from anyone. According to the
Coleman report summary of the episode:
The lawyer who had brought the Jackson case, commented that
he thought Plan B entirely too conservative but, after listening
to those who spoke against it, he thought it was "half a loaf."
A member of the committee suggested that Plan B did not constitute
integration, but unless Plan B were adopted as a first step, there
would be de facto segregation in Pasadena.
The Board defended its actions against a proposal from the floor called
Plan C which would have resulted in an ethnic distribution by 1965
of 907 Negroes in Muir and 28 in PHS. At the Meeting on April 23,
Jenkins reiterated the Board's policy to maintain ethnic balance.
That intent seemed on the liberal side of the debate despite the mani-
27. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity , p.481.
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fest failure of the system to have racial balance
—especially at the
elementary level where the critical gap between whites and blacks
in test scores developed. 28
After a month of debate, the Board recognized that their
simple hope for more racial balance would not be met without a
bruising fight in the community. For many persons, that fight seemed
far worse than persistent segregation which was quiet and peaceful.
Thus, one board member indicated her recognition of de facto segre-
gation resulting from housing discrimination, but she preferred to
ignore the result. Her reasoning showed a remarkable capacity for
ethics to justify segregation:
...a quota plan or number limitation on any race is wrong,
discriminatory, degrading. What earthly right have we to say
to a child, "Because there are too many of your certain race
you must go elsewhere." No more may we restrict how many
persons of any race may live in this community. A quota
restricts the personal liberty—rights, if you choose— of
some students to go to school nearest that place his family
has chosen to live. 29
At that juncture, Walter Jenkins proposed an open enrollment
plan which seemed to bypass most immediate objections to earlier
proposals. Originally, Jenkins proposed that all students except
Negroes should be distributed among three high schools on a geographic
basis, leaving an unfilled capacity of 18 per cent at Muir, 13 per cent
at PHS, and 17 per cent at the proposed Blair High School. Blacks
28. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity
,
p. 482.
29. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity
,
P. 482.
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could select any one of the high schools and would have their first
choice until a school reached full capacity. Thus whites would have
neighborhood schools and Blacks would have integrated schools-as
long as they bore the costs of time and transportation necessary
to achieve that end.
On the advice of the County Counsel that any plan based on
race was illegal, the Board eventually adopted an open district
which included most of the Washington, Cleveland, Lincoln, and Madison
elementary school districts. That subterfuge, which seemed necessary
before the Jackson decision in June of that year, allowed the Board
to include a major part of the black population without mentioning
race, color, or creed.
On June 11, 1963, the Board unanimously adopted the Superin-
tendent s modified plan. That fall the bond issue for Blair High
School handily passed. On January 7, 1964, Superintendent Walter
Jenkins presented a detailed plan for carrying out the open district
plan. He had to project enrollments for whites and others living
in the PHS and Blair geographic districts so that a sufficient number
of spaces would remain open to achieve a closer racial balance.
Apparently his estimates were thrown off by the movement of parents
with high school age children into the PHS district. When assignments
were made on March 25, 1964 only 48 open spaces remained at PHS and
the spaces at Muir had jumped to 191. Under strong attack from
spokesmen for the NAACP, Jenkins worked out an accommodation whereby
nearly one hundred Negro students living in the open district switched
their first choice from Muir to PHS.
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Jenkins and the Board of Education had gained a considerable
education in matters of racism in American cities in the nearly three
years since the Jackson suit had started. Ihey knew racial balance
would not be maintained by pretending no problem existed. As one Board
member wrote:
H thatu at least a Verity of lawyers would now
m
® atisfi
^
d
» afte
^
the jackson case, that a school board couldost certainly employ ethnic considerations in drawing districtlines, and it is not necessary for a school board to engage in
a verbal minuet mincing back and forth and sideways, talking of
capacity of school facilities, geographical considerations, etc.,
while slowly and surely progressing toward its real goal:
compliance with the declared policy which requires alleviation of
racial imbalance. 30
But most white Pasadenans preferred a "verbal minuet" while abandoning
public education.
4. Whites Reject Integration
Although the program was cumbersome and not fully effective,
Jenkin s open district plan was cited in the Coleman report as a
model which might work elsewhere. The first year fell short of its
goals; Muir had 29.6 per cent Negroes (rather than 23 per cent) and
PHS had 5.5 per cent (rather than 10 per cent). "There is still
confidence, however," the Coleman summary added, "that the original
3—year goals can be met." Certainly as of early 1964 no one had any
solutions for racial imbalance in the elementary schools, but the
30. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity
, p. 485.
M-
acks011 case established a hopeful precedent. And for many liberals
both black and white the most hopeful sigh was the official recognition
that a problem existed and that the Board would work toward racial
31balance.
Before three years had elapsed, the shift of white families
away from the Muir district, together with a rapid increase of black
population, again left the high schools racially imbalanced. In
1966-1967, the Jenkins plan had called for Muir to contain 18.5 per
cent Negroes, PHS to contain 12.9 per cent, and Blair to contain 17.6
per cent for an average of 15.8 per cent. 'Instead, Blacks made up
18.8 per cent of the high school population, with Muir having 32.6
per cent, PHS 7.9 per cent, and Blair 22.1 per cent. Since Negroes
made up 20.6 per cent of the Junior High School population and 27.5
P^r cent of the elementary level, the Board of Education could foresee
a persistent problem with imbalance.
Yet the Board—which viewed itself as answerable to the whites
who voted them into office—saw few options. In 1964, Pasadenans had
overwhelmingly supported Proposition 14, an amendment to the state
constitution which effectively sanctioned discrimination by realtors,
landlords, and home owners. They had elected a former member of the
John Birch Society to the State Senate. They had rejected the effort
31. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity
,
p. 484.
32. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity
,
p. 483. Data
also taken from ’’Pasadena City Schools Racial and Ethnic Distribution
of Enrollment."
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of Emmett G. Mickle to reinstate ward voting for City Board of
Directors—even though he demonstrated that he could win a contest in
the Northwest community against the white incumbent (who handily won
under the at large system because of east Pasadena's votes). There were
in short, no signs that the other agencies and organizations which
made up civic Pasadena were prepared to see, much less accept, those
nearly one In five Pasadenans with black skins. 33
Probably the most significant test of the attitude and anti-
Negro bias of white Pasadenans was reflected in their abandonment of
public education—despite the success of districting in maintaining
half of that system more than 90 per cent Caucasian. Between 1958 and
October 1966, Caucasian enrollment dropped by 1,263. (About 900 had
left when La Canada withdrew from the main district.) Two years later,
another 1,600 had left. By then some 30 per cent of the district's
school age children were in parochial or private schools. Between 1958
and October 1966, Negro enrollment increased from 3,142 to 7,676, or
an increase of 4,535 students. By 1969 Blacks and other minority
groups would constitute 39.9 per cent of the total enrollment in the
public school system. Simple predictions showed minority groups
would have a majority in the district within three years.
33. Emmett G. Mickle, a member of the Charter Reform Committee and
President of the Westside Study Center Board, ran for the City Board of
Directors in 1967 with a campaign to restore the ward voting system.
Although he was defeated, an analysis of voting precincts published in
the Independent Star-News
,
March 19, 1967, showed the race was even
in the precincts represented by District 1.
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The Citizens Task Force Study Committee on High School
Districting revealed in its Preliminary Report to the Board of
Education the same unwillingness to face growing racial imbalance.
In its first stab at identifying the problem, the Committee said
"Pasadena faces a future comparable to those of many eastern cities."
The Committee suggested that the leadership of all minority groups
be involved along with "our governmental agencies, the Chambers of
Commerce, the Planning Commissions, the Boards of Realtors." By
inference, the problem lay in population changes. Thus, "Failure to
stabilize the communities within the district will in the long run
result in a future comparable to that of Washington D.C., Baltimore,
and Compton."
^
Finally, the Committee made a specific reference to the problem
in relation to the new enrollment figures. "This decrease in
Caucasian student population along with the significant increase in the
Negro student population goes to the heart of the overall problem
confronting the entire community." Was the problem simply too many
Blacks? The Committee quickly tossed in a liberal bromide. "The
Committee has concluded that equality of curriculum offerings and
comparable levels of achievement are desirable. It would appear that
any relatively high Negro enrollment within any high school would
present a critical situation for the entire school." Should the reader
34. "Preliminary Report to the Board of Education from the
Citizens Task Force Study Committee on High School Districting,"
February 7, 1967, p.l. Same citation for the following two paragraphs.
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conclude that the problem with Negroes was that they were not equal?
Almost bluntly, the Committee presented the solution that
equality of education required that Negroes be somehow equally
dispersed. The Committee recommended that the city act "to reduce...
the density of the population in north-west Pasadena and Altadena and
to enforce all housing codes designed to prevent overcrowded conditions
in existing dwellings." Also, the Committee urged "that real estate
brokers help stabilize the community by discouraging panic selling
by Caucasians on the west-side, by encouraging more Caucasians to
move into integrated areas, and by assisting minority persons to
find homes in surrounding communities, thus taking some of the pressure
off the Pasadena Unified School District." Finally, the Committee
attempted to reclaim its liberal reputation: "All church, social,
and civic groups must be urged to strengthen human relations and to
establish responsible dialogue relative to the community problems
in order that the citizens will take the opportunity to understand
the situation and fully participate in developing ultimate solutions."
The Pasadena Council of Parents and Teachers "Report on
High School Districting" approached a key issue directly. "If a high
school loses too many of its college-oriented students, it no longer
has enough qualified students to justify teaching certain advanced
courses, so that the quality of the school starts to decline and it
no longer can offer a truly comprehensive program." High school
students had electives which made the difference between preparation
68
for college or preparation for nothing. Although the Council
probably recognized that much of the blame for the lower achievement
levels of Blacks should be placed on the elementary and junior high
schools, they nevertheless claimed: "Our district has 28 elementary
schools, serving 28 neighborhood areas. The identical classes are
presented in each school, so a child receives the same basic program
regardless of which elementary school he attends." 35
As a result of the new flurry of studies in the spring of
1967, the Board proposed to return the Burbank and Noyes elementary
schools to Muir's district. According to the new Plan A, by 1970
the percentage racial balances would be as follows:
Caucasian Negro Other
Blair 62.5 19.0 18.5
Muir 65.9 23.9 10.2
PHS 75.0 18.2 6.8
The plan would require some additional bussing but it seemed the
only way to maintain comprehensive programs at each high school over
the next few years.
(Instead, in the elections of 1967 two incumbents lost and
the new members succeeded in reversing Plan A. Muir did enroll a
minority of Caucasians. Whites left the district in greater numbers.
Early in 1970 Pasadena stood under a court order to integrate all its
35. "Report on High School Districting," Pasadena Council of
Parents and Teachers, May 8, 1967, p. 1.
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schools by that fall. Thus, Instead of achieving racial balance at
the high school level, Pasadena became the first school district
west of the Mississippi to be threatened with a loss of funds under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.)
The long struggle among white and powerful Pasadenans to do
something about their own discrimination against Blacks seemed light
years removed from life in Northwest Pasadena. At a time when
officials spoke as if Pasadena still had a model educational system,
most Blacks who finished its high schools could not read past the fifth
grade level. While noting certain differences between Blacks and
whites
,
Pasadena liberals still boasted that all its elementary
schools had the same program. That meant the system was suited for
white, middle-class children who learned to read as much at home as
in school and from materials which related to their experiences.
Certainly the "same" program did not produce the same achievement
levels in Cleveland and Washington schools as in Don Benito and Noyes.
Thus the schools simply presented an exaggerated form of a
common Pasadena attitude. The schools claimed to be a success while
failing to educate children from the ghetto. Similarly, the city
proclaimed its reputation as a good place to live while persistently
making life unpleasant for Blacks. Again, in the schools as for
housing, white Pasadenans in control sought to discourage the fast
growing minority. Instead of working to make Muir a comprehensive
school where black children could learn, they sought to place the
burden of even distribution in schools upon black families. Rather
than admitting to their failure in schools, the Board and most teachers
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regarded Blacks as an unfair burden somehow preventing them from
teaching.
5. Pasadena and VJestside Study Center
—
"Time Is Running Out"
While Pasadena in the 1960’s had its share of those legitimate
urban problems which hit many eastern cities earlier—obsolescent
buildings and a fast growing poor population—it also had some dis-
tinct advantages . The city had resources and it had a tradition of
civic action. The downtown merchants who exercised unofficial control
had well-established working relationships which made possible many
informal acts of civic betterment. Caltech, though complacent in
Pasadena affairs as long as it received its requests for zoning
variances allowing new buildings
,
represented a potential for knowledge
and for mobilizing liberal sentiment. In short, at no point in the
1960's did Pasadena’s difficulties appear unsolvable, even from the
point of view of white residents who had no interest in uplifting the
Northwest area but a simple desire to keep Pasadena a good place to
live—-as they defined it.
By the end of the 1960's, under threat of a legal suit for
desegregation, after innumerable investigations and reports, and in
light of an undeniable population shift, white Pasadenans faced the
facts that had long been known realities in the Black community. As
Harry Sheldon, President of the Chamber of Commerce admitted in April,
1969, "We are experiencing the white flight, and as people
move we
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are pulling into the community people of lower economic capabilities."
Such statements of urgency were met with a new tone of determination
in other city leaders. William Pankey, real estate official, in the
same Los Angeles Times article declared, "Anyone who says Pasadena is
going down the tubes is just nuts. There's too much at stake. We are
just not going to lose it." 36
The hope for change, made possible by Pasadena’s unique
resources, and the urgency for change, evident in increasing forecasts
of decay, were symbolized in Westside Study Center's hour glass emblem
and motto, "Time is running out." Certainly, time was running out for
a school board unable to pass a single bond issue, for white liberals
faced with the exodus of their neighbors
,
for Black children floundering
in deteriorating schools, and, especially, for young men like Duke
whose adult careers stood at a frightening crossroad.
The story of Duke made clear that the need for Westside had its
roots years before in the young lives of Black Pasadenans. Duke’s
experiences in Pasadena schools programmed his life for conflict and
defeat.
Duke spoke of his school years with mixed feelings. An out-
standing athlete in junior high school, he won acclaim and a form of
success. In ninth grade he won the All-American Trophy for being the
most outstanding participant in his junior high school. In high
school, he excelled in track, football, baseball and basketball until
36. Townsend, "Pasadena’s Crown City Image Tarnished."
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the point in the spring of his junior year when he was permanently
expelled. Clearly quick and bright, Duke experienced far different
rewards in academics than in athletics. 37
Duke began school at Cleveland Elementary School. At that
time the school was known as one of the better schools in the area,
a reputation that still continues, although it is slowly being eroded.
It drew a large part of its student body from the "golden ghetto"—
an area in the Northwest, quite large in size, which was made of upper
middle class Negro families: doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other
professionals. At the end of second grade, Duke was transferred to
Washington Elementary School, reputed to be the worst elementary school
in town. Duke reported that his "fighting and cussing" were the
reasons for the transfer, and he said his mother just accepted the
word of the school system and did not go in to' protest the transfer.
Duke learned to read at Cleveland, but at Washington, he "kind of
stopped learning." He said it was harder to get to Washington, since
he lived two blocks from Cleveland, but had to take the bus to
Washington. He remembers Washington as a much rougher school.
When he entered junior high school, Duke was put in a special class
in which he stayed until he left school in eleventh grade. The classes
were large, with 30 to 40 students, but Duke got good grades—"A'
s" and
"B’s" mostly. Dr. Welch, a Pasadena School administrator, described
37. Pat Sutton, "Duke: A Study of Deviance," (an unpublished
case study)
.
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the special class as a class for educable mentally retarded youngsters.
He said that, " a youngster like Duke was known to be dull normal,
according to the school records, but was not mentally retarded." He
added, somewhat despairingly, that the schools put youngsters like
Duke in classes with the mentally retarded because they did not know
what else to do with them.
Duke's high school career continued to be tumultuous: he was
suspended seven times on charges ranging from fighting to keeping a
loaded gun in his locker. He was finally expelled for hitting a boy
so hard around the neck that the boy was temporarily paralyzed.
Dr. Welch had admitted with embarassment the past practice
of transferring an undesirable student from a good school to a bad
one. He also had found it hard to justify placing a mentally capable
student in retarded classes and giving him "A's" and "B's". Yet Dr. Welch
had also admitted without apology that youngsters like Duke were,
in later years, placed in classes called "educationally mentally
handicapped." For Duke, time ran out before Westside could overcome
the damage done by the schools.
Westside' s success, then, was a product of converging forces
in Pasadena. It only existed because Pasadena had failed in the past
to house and hire and educate black citizens. It only existed
because time was running out for Blacks and whites alike. If, by the
end of the 1960's, the "glass plate barrier" was lowered some, it
was partly due to Westside' s success in communicating the presence
of oppression and partly because Westside suggested the hope of a
creative solution.
C H A P T E R III
MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PARTICIPATION - WESTSIDE' S WAR ON POVERTY
The viable alternative that Westside presented rested on its
strategy of self help. From its start, Westside Study Center relied
primarily upon time volunteered by the staff and others from the
Northwest community. As Westside grew, many white Pasadenans came
to tutor or to assist in other special projects. Small local
donations kept things going; in one case, a man volunteered to pay
Westside* s phone bill for a month in return for being tutored.
After surviving for two years. Center contributions became
tax deductible and sometimes totaled as high as $1,000 per month from
various individuals. Without a largely underpaid or volunteer staff,
that sum was insufficient to organize and maintain a limited tutoring
program as originally planned by Gentry, Larsuel, and Williams. The
real dream of Westside staff and supporters was not just to tutor
children and find people jobs. Until the tutoring program had some
impact on Pasadena schools, it only did the school's job better and
cheaper.
If Westside were to effect a noticeable change in Pasadena, if
it were to answer more than a small portion of the requests for help,
it had to grow. Center staff knew persons who wanted help with learning,
or with finding jobs, or with straightening out their lives, or with
finding a new sense of direction. However, too often there was
not time enough, or staff enough. A volunteer tutorial program
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in Northwest Pasadena could not compensate for the things untaught
by the schools. One individual helped was a gain. But it posed no
threat to the city or to the traditional miseducation of black
youngsters
.
Westside, then, had to grow in three directions: First, it
had to expand to meet the needs of black Pasadenans in the Northwest.
The more Westside succeeded, the more it saw to be done, the more
people looked to it for vital human services. Second, it had to expand
to meet the needs of an expanding staff. As staff members grew to their
potential, in the New Careers model, Westside looked to wider spheres
of influence. Finally, Westside realized that separate individuals,
operating with similar goals out of a variety of methods, could change
the lives of people in the Northwest and could communicate that impact
to the white community.
Prior to 1964, self help organizations in ghettoes had few
illusions about obtaining funds. Both liberals and conservatives
who donated to charity preferred safe organizations which would dis-
tribute their benefactions. Boy's Clubs and local Y's often provided
important facilities—especially for boys and girls. Yet one could
scarcely imagine the YWCA or the American Friends Service Committee
as the focal organization in a struggle to change Pasadena and to
improve its school system. Rich and eccentric benefactors gave their
money to art museums, Knott's Berry Farm, or a chamber music series
at Caltech.
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To meet the needs it served and to mobilize a wider range of
resources, Westside had to grow and reach out into the larger community
It had to seek support in the city at large—from civic organizations,
from federal agencies, from private businesses—to broaden its impact
and to supply the many practical needs for staff support, building
costs, transportation, equipment, and communications. That process
of seeking support, in itself, also provided a vital learning
experience for Westside's staff.
No experience gave Westside a better insight into fund raising
and politics than President Johnson’s War on Poverty. A liberal
administration, in part expiating for the assassination of John F.
Kennedy, passed in 1964 the most liberal economic measure since
the New Deal. The Office of Economic Opportunity, staffed with ex
-
Peace Corpsmen and other dedicated young liberals, enlisted in the
campaign to share affluence with America’s poor. They knew that
despite the inclusion of all the poor and Appalachia, the real test
would be changing the lives of urban Blacks.
1. Washington’s War on Poverty
In March, 1964, President Johnson announced: "I have called
for a national War on Poverty. Our objective—total victory.” His
message to Congress at least allowed community action organizations,
such as the Westside Study Center, to hope for federal support. The
President promised to poor people that the government would make an
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effort to allow them to develop and use their capacities, as we
have been allowed to develop and use ours, so that they can share,
as others share. In the promise of this nation." That mixture of
paternalism and promised assistance was largely built into any
program which helped someone to self help.l
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 included a provision
giving every American community the opportunity to develop a
comprehensive plan to fight its own poverty—and help them to carry
out their plans." Specifically, the government pledged to finance
up to 90 per cent of "local plans striking at the many unfilled needs
which underlie poverty in each community." As with welfare and
urban renewal, the federal government would make money available
to cities for them to deal with their problems; but unlike earlier
programs, the War on Poverty called for localities to involve the
poor. Indeed, Washington called for their "maximum feasible
participation. "2
The key to both the successes and failures of the War on
Poverty lay in the ambiguous phrase "community action." From the
start, the Johnson administration was of several minds about the idea.
Together with other former New Dealers, the President drew upon his
1. Lyndon B. Johnson, "Presidential Message on Poverty (address
to Congress, March 16, 1964)," quoted in Herman P. Miller (ed.), Poverty
American Style (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.,
1966), p. 212
.
2. Herman P. Miller (ed.), Poverty American Style
, pp. 213,215.
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experiences with the war on unemployment of the 1930's. The Works
Projects Administration, under which Johnson had served as the Texas
coordinator for the National Youth Corps, had relied upon local
initiative and organization for projects which provided jobs. Clearly
the political appeal of New Deal programs and rhetoric for economic
uplift had considerable appeal to the President—and many of his
advisers
.
The apparent success of non-violent direct action in the
civil rightsmovement in the South encouraged a belief that a similar
method might work in Northern urbanareas. As Martin Luther King, Jr.
had reminded readers of the New York Times in 1962 "probably the
most powerful force ... in breaking down the barriers of segregation
is the new determination of the Negro himself. ... He has come to
feel that he ijs somebody. And with this new sense of ' somebodiness
'
and self respect, a new Negro has emerged with a new determination
to achieve freedom and human dignity whatever the cost may be."^
Some liberals hoped to enlist that determination in the war against
poverty's key problem—hard core unemployed adults in the nation's
black ghettoes.
Within the government, the President's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime under Robert Kennedy had funded pilot
projects to demonstrate the possibilities for community action
Given in Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York: Bantam
Books, 1965), p.82. (Italics in text.)
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programs. According to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "the idea of
community action was in one sense the purest product of academia
and the Ford Foundation. Its underlying propositions concerning
opportunity structure and anomie constituted a systematic theory
as to the origins and cures, if not of poverty, at least of
juvenile delinquency." Given support by the Council of Economic
Advisers and the Bureau of the Budget, the notion of community
action promised some way to unite at the local level an increasing
array of federal programs designed to deal with poverty and dis-
crimination in urban areas.
4
As initially put forward by social scientists, community action
had meant more "maximum feasible participation" than a concert of city
and local agencies. Presumably, poor persons needed an opportunity
to break out of their cycle of self-reinforced behavior which some
labeled a "culture of poverty." According to Cloward and Ohlin,
delinquency resulted from a lack of opportunity for socially
accepted activities. Thus Kenneth Clark’s initial proposal for
Mobilization for Youth had argued that "in order to reduce the
incidence of delinquent patterns, we must provide the social and
psychological resources that make conformity possible.
4. Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Professors and the Poor," in Daniel
P. Moynihan (ed.), On Understanding Poverty (New York: Basic- Books,
Inc.
,
1968)
,
p. 11.
5. Kenneth B. Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, A Relevant War Against
Poverty (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p.30.
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Thus seen, community action went beyond offering opportunities
to the poor. Both the provision of services to the needy— the notion
behind traditional social welfare programs—and the provision of
opportunities assumed a degree of helplessness on the part of poor
persons which was inconsistent with "maximum feasible participation"
by the poor. It was also inconsistent with the drive for rights and
dignity which the civil rights movement had unloosed as well as with the
anger and bitterness of ghetto residents expressed in Watts and
Pasadena in August 1965. As Kenneth Clark noted, the participation
of poor persons assumed "that where opportunities are blocked and
services are unavailable to the poor, then the poor, themselves, must
be organized to deal with these and other common personal and community
problems ."6
Finally, community action contained a notion of leadership by
the poor in order to represent their interests in decision-making
groups. According to Clark's Mobilization for Youth proposal,
"Participation by adults in the decision-making matters that affect
their interests increases their sense of identification with the
community and the larger social order." The later HARYOU proposal
spoke of "the stimulation of concern among individuals who share a
common predicament, who are the victims of long-standing community
problems and injustices " 7 The successes of the Muslims and other
6. Clark and Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty , p. 34.
Clark and Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty , pp. 34-35.7.
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militant groups in organizing and presenting their demands gave fresh
force among poor and black people for the possibilities of counter-
vailing power. (Clearly, Washington never thought through the
implications of these aspects of community action for local government.)
Since no one in Washington, or elsewhere, knows how to eliminate
poverty (within reasonable budget limitations), the Office of Economic
Opportunity adopted a tone of modesty, a desire for experimentation,
and a preference for testing out community action in practice rather
than working through its implications in theory. As Moynihan noted,
Sargent Shriver had "no taste and little patience for abstractions
such as lay behind the community-action concept." Also, a Johnsonian
drive for consensus and speed prevented a clarifying debate. "The
resulting program," Moynihan concluded, "thus represented not a choice
among policies so much as a collection of them." Furthermore, he noted
that "it is possible to view the War on Poverty as a device that enabled
the federal government to launch a fairly wide range of programs designed
primarily to aid Negro Americans without having to specify their purpose."
And thus racism was another idea mingled into the phrase of community
O
action.
°
By tossing the complexities of American racism on top of the
complications of American poverty, the War on Poverty opened up pos-
sibilities for community conflicts which could not be covered over
with the modest sums appropriated by Congress. In most cities, as in
Pasadena, local officials had become exceedingly careless about rights,
8. Moynihan, On Understanding Poverty
, pp. 12-13, 14.
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dignity, and public safety of poor minorities. Any reasonable community
action which sought the greatest leverage for change would goad those
existing agencies into serving the needs of minorities. And because
Blacks had endured discrimination for so long, cities could change
only by admitting their previous failures.
As a result of a multiplicity of meanings and purposes
associated with community action, no part of the total war on poverty
aroused more hopes, more frustrations, and more criticisms. Moynihan
placed part of the failure exactly on its circuitous history. "Thus,"
he wrote, "the idea of community action in, the context of opportunity
theory was conceived by white social scientists, launched by white
foundation executives and political activists, brought to Washington
by the same, developed in the (white) President’s Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime, sold to white economists in the Executive
Office Building, and drafted into legislation by the white White House
task force on poverty." 9 The problem was not just that whites could
not understand poverty and racism but that a major program was launched
using the idea of community action without respect for its power and its
potential for legitimizing black demands.
Thus well-paid professional staffs of local Community Action
Agencies organized meetings and passed on guidelines from the Office of
Economic Opportunity, but they scarcely convinced ghetto residents that
they had a worthwhile role. In Los Angeles, for example, the Economic
9. Moynihan, On Understanding Poverty
,
p. 15.
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and Youth Opportunities Agency spent $60,000 to elect poverty
representatives. Some 2,659 persons voted out of an estimated 300,000
families which met the poverty criteria. Such elections mocked the
naive hopes of many who believed that such a modest attempt could
arouse the hope and determination of poor residents to change their
lives
.
> •
e
•
Nevertheless, Sargent Shriver and officials in the 0E0 clung
to the rhetoric of community action. Quoting a demand from a Watts
resident for control because "It is our lives," Shriver responded that
0E0 had "no intention, of course, of letting any one group, even the
poor themselves, 'run the jobs' or 'run the programs.'" Still he
insisted, "that token participation is unacceptable."!0
Nowhere was the gap between the promise of community action as
seen by the poor and as seen by Washington Officials more apparent than
in the Annotated Summary of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 : "The
most successful community action. ... usually includes the political,
business, labor, and religious leaders, the school board, the employment
service, the public welfare department, private social welfare agencies,
and neighborhood houses in a coordinated attack on poverty." But those
agencies had already failed the poor and almost universally exhibited
a pervasive white racism. Thus it sounded strange to add that "above
all it includes the poor people of the community whose first opportunity
10. See Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, September 9, 1966, Subject: Involvement of the Poor in
all 0E0 Programs.
must be the opportunity to help themselves ,"H
The Westside Study Center staff had already exercised the
opportunity to help themselves. Following the disturbance in August
1965, 0E0 allocated substantial funds for Los Angeles. With the
assistance of Mrs. Eilene Linnblatt from the County Community Services
the Center submitted a proposal for a comprehensive program for
alienated youths in Northwest Pasadena-Altadena. In the summer of
1966, the Los Angeles Community Action Agency (EYOA) promised some
funds on a "summer crash" basis for Westside Study Center. That summer
the staff worked long and hard. If their program succeeded, they
anticipated on-going support. Cynicism and frustration had not yet
pervaded the War on Poverty.
2. The Summer Program, 1966
The 0E0 grant for the summer of 1966 gave Westside an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate a comprehensive program for Northwest Pasadena.
The five components Westside designed—Education, Career and Job Develop-
ment, Community Services, Sensitivity Training and Cultural Orientation,
and Administrative Services—remained the organizing themes of Westside
thereafter. Planned for a budget of $25,000 per month of $300,000 per
year, that comprehensive program allowed Westside to involve enough
people from Northwest Pasadena so that the city's agencies had to
11. Sargent Shriver, "An Annotated Summary of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964," in Miller, Poverty American Style , p.224.
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respond. 12
The educational section occupied a primary place in the
program because it expressed an underlying conviction that the
purpose was to help hitherto exlcuded minorities to find a place
and a purpose for their lives in Pasadena in the 1960's and 1970's.
Children who were made to believe they could not learn to read or
write were cut off from jobs and future income before they had any
choices. Failure of the schools not only limited the skills which
young black men brought to the job market, but it weakened their
confidence and their sell concepts so necessary to keep pushing
for better things. Discrimination required persistent hope and
effort to overcome.
While the education program emphasized the long run effect
on children who were taught reading from irrelevant materials and
through an inadequate range of services for all age groups, the major
dream, was "to bring about improvement and change in the educational
system of this area through demonstration of effective means and
methods of teaching minority youth." In the meantime, Westside
offered tutorial assistance for youths already in school. Further, it
proposed programs "to give vocational skills and strengthen youth's
self concept to supplement job readiness." Finally, Westside planned
to arrange vocational training with companies who agreed to hire youths.
12. All quotations in this section are from the "Westside Study
Center Youth Development Project" prepared in the fall of 1966 and
based on the experience of the "summer crash" program.
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By relying upon volunteers and coordinating with existing
programs
,
the Center hoped to bring about changes without the
budgetary support required by public schools. Two coordinators
with assistants would manage the tutoring and vocational sides of
scheduling, arrangements, and perform other tasks to help the
coordinators. Westside anticipated more than one thousand hours of
volunteered tutoring time each month. In addition to providing
a variety of services, this component served as an outlet for
college students, housewives with grown children, and others who
wanted to do something yet had no secure sense of what they could
do.
The job development component dealt directly with the critical
level of unemployment among young men and women in the Northwest
Pasadena-Altadena area. Most firms in the San Gabriel Valley had not
hired Blacks for open-ended jobs. Pasadena's middle class Blacks
drove to Los Angeles, but poor Blacks found no meaningful jobs in
local stores and industrial firms. Under the guidance of a group
leader and job counselor at the Center, teams of youth aides visited
firms and asked about possible job openings. In four weeks, sixty-
eight youths were placed on jobs with advancement potential, a substan-
tial break in the resistance to Blacks by local industries.
At the same time, the youth aides operating in teams gained
invaluable experience and self confidence. Many personal feelings
of inadequacy and fear of rejection which plagued young Blacks in
personnel interviews were overcome. When youths sought job openings
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for others as part of a team representing the Center, youths found
they could talk to company representatives in positive terms. Thus
forty part time team members gained experience with work and with
employment opportunities. More importantly, their success built
their self-concept and pride in being able to help others find a job.
That esprit de corps" which pervaded the teams manifested
itself in the long hours put in by aides who were paid on a half
time basis. Enthusiasm and a positive attitude carried forward
in the pre-employment counseling and follow-up services. New workers
who found employment through Wes tside—often after giving up on the
State Employment Service-had some of that pride rub off on them.
Furthermore, Westside offered counseling and individualized employment
training for persons who wanted help in holding a job or in gaining
skills for career advancement.
In keeping -with an emphasis upon open-ended jobs with career
potential, Westside applied New Career concepts to its own staff.
Assistant coordinators and team leaders got special training and
upgrading in community contact techniques so they could advance
within the Center or take a career job with industry. Similarly,
Westside trained aides in community contact methods including approach ,
conversational methods, and appearance so that they might become
assistants. Openness and staff flexibility made for inefficiency in a
narrow sense but well served the major purpose of upgrading hard core
unemployed youth.
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The community services component extended Westside's educa-
tional concerns to include the relationship between individuals in
Northwest Pasadena and the city. "All that goes on in the neighborhood
or community affects the youth directly or indirectly," the proposal
noted. "This means that institutions which impinge upon youth as
well as youth's behavior must be the concern of the neighborhood
to see that these institutions are meeting the needs of youth."
Center staff knew how often a city agency had ignored the needs of
black citizens especially those youth with the greatest opportunity
to benefit from community services.
As Westside pointed out, there were few "community supports
to help a youth stabilize if he gets into trouble." Poverty limited
many parents' capacity to control and help their children. Cramped
living quarters and an absence of home-centered activities encouraged
boys and girls to linger on streets and parks on their way home
after school. Such services as the Boy's Club and the YMCA, the YWCA,
and the city recreation program ordinarily required some transporta-
tion, some encouragement, and some ability for kids to make use of
available facilities. Such traditional programs seldom reached out
to involve youths already feeling alienated by parents, schools, and
their city.
For many youths in Northwest Pasadena, alienation and
delinquency began with an early arrest. Westside developed liaisons
with the local police, probation department, and the schools. Through
those contacts as well as their familiarity with the neighborhood,
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staff members could learn about an arrest and discover the circum-
stances. Few youth crimes resulted from careful premeditation. Then
Westside staff consulted with police and judges. "As a result of the
Center's work, first offenders have been counseled and released on
condition that they become part of the Center’s program." Not
everyone thus released thereafter led a blameless life; but judges,
police, and parents came increasingly to see Westside as a creative
alternative to repeated delinquency arrests.
As another part of community services, Westside proposed
additional counseling and group meetings to help bridge the communi-
cations gap between parents and their children. Often built up
tensions at home contributed to failing work in school which in turn
encouraged a feeling of anger and a desire to build self confidence
through other actions. Eventually, such actions led to trouble with
the police and a pattern of anti—social behavior. Often inadequately
—
how could it be otherwise—Westside functioned as a surrogate family.
It was a place to go; it meant involvement with people trying to make
meaningful changes. That association could encourage a renewed effort
to improve relationships at home, in schools, and with one’s own image
of himself.
Also, the community services component organized a Weekly
Neighborhood Forum and proposed to publish a weekly newsletter.
There was a need for more communication within Northwest Pasadena
and for relating its needs and fears to the services, ideas, and fears
of the wider region. By presenting open forums with speakers
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representing such diverse organizations as the American Nazi party
and Maulana Ron Karenga's US, the Center aroused a open discussion
ideas and viewpoints of keen interest to Blacks in America. The
mimeographed newsletter aimed to publicize "available services and
opportunities through the Center."
A fourth component provided sensitivity training and
cultural orientation. In 1965 sensitivity training was a relatively
untested idea, but it seemed particularly useful for getting at some
of the irritants of interpersonal relations between races. In small
groups, whites and Blacks could bring out their feelings. They
could discuss previous incidents where hostility or discrimination
or some slight had occured. Often the shock of discovering that
others had different perceptions and feelings proved sufficient to
open a dialogue.
Westside proposed two focal points: sensitivity training for
professionals providing services for Northwest Pasadena and cultural
orientation for persons from the community "finding themselves in new
situations of employment or training." Sensitivity training groups
provided an opportunity for community people to engage in extended
dialogue with agency and school personnel about their "behavior in
relation to members of the community." Repeatedly ,white professionals
expressed their surprise and shock at learning how their actions
appeared bigoted and definitely uninterested in the problems of the
poor, especially poor Blacks. By expressing their feelings and
insisting that professionals respond with an account of their feelings,
allowed for a kind of interchange on an equal level.the groups
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Although sensitivity and cultural orientation called for
only one full time coordinator, its importance exceeded its place
in the budget* Westside staff members had to communicate with all
kinds of people at all kinds of levels. For example, staff appeared
in court and spoke with judges in their chamber and then also spoke
in the language of youth to establish a relationship with boys on the
street in ways which white judges and professional juvenile officers
could not.
Sensitivity and cultural awareness played a key part in
Westside' s ability to communicate ,simply because discrimination was so
much a part of the lives of Pasadenans both black and white. For city
officials and most whites the practice of racism had become so habitual
that it required no more thought than brushing one's teeth in the
morning. Presuming Blacks to be unequal whether genetically or due to
cultural disadvantages, white Pasadenans saw the deterioration of John
Muir not as a result of Board policies but as a result of the presence
of Blacks. Thus Westside had to develop techniques and a position of
influence in order to amplify the impact of Westside' s programs upon
the city.
As spelled out in its major proposal, self help remained the
Center's philosophy. But meaningful self help in Pasadena called for
"large scale employment of indigenous youths and young adults
to
provide:"
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A. A broad educational thrust utilizing a variety of settings.
B. A multi-service agency geared and staffed to supplement and
reinforce functions either indigenous to the neighborhood
and family or presently not met by the traditional agencies,
such as the police, public schools, probation department,
Department of Employment, etc.
C. The yardstick agency which tries out and validates new
approaches and which in its competitive coordinating thrust
With the established agencies changes their policies and
practices.
D. The community-based agency as a rallying point and spokesman
and representative of community interests.
E. The community-based agency as the core of an interest group
alliance extending outside of the local community.
A comprehensive program fulfilled "the philosophy of maximum partici-
pation in a program of, for,and by the residents of the area involved."
3. Community Action versus Self Help
Washington’s War on Poverty did play a significant role for
Westside. At the very least, it provided the rhetoric of a national
priority which heightened the visibility of Westside. Prior to the
War on Poverty, the white power structure of Pasadena had resisted any
federal programs— from urban renewal to welfare that would admit
that the city had any problems. The peculiar combination of
shock,
after the Watts and Pasadena civil disorders, and greed,
when War on
Poverty payoffs became too attractive to pass up,
motivated civic
leaders in Pasadena to take up the banner of community
action for the
poor.
Probably, in the short run, the War on Poverty
did more good
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than harm. From the inside, the national commitment to a War on
Poverty provided for a time some of the hope in Westside' s "hope
factor." Despite justifiable skepticism, the early claims of the
War on Poverty gave Westside staff the hope that their efforts were
building toward wider circles of support and impact. Additionally,
the funding of the Summer 1966 program provided Westside with an
occasion to lay out in detail a comprehensive program and to structure
an organization for its implementation.
But in the long run Washington's War on Poverty substituted
rhetoric for program. In spite of the talk about community action
and the possibilities for meaningful change from federal intervention
in local power stalemates, it soon resembled riot prevention rather
than community action. Most community action groups found money
available only- during the summer months and mainly for activities
involving youths. A program which kept teenagers occupied picking up
trash along a railroad right of way obtained funding over programs
designed to provide experiences which prepared youths for meaningful
jobs. Federal funds flowed into programs which promised to keep
troublesome elements occupied. Local agencies which received funds
became responsible for keeping their city peaceful. Community action
had somehow become community inaction.
From the point of view of War on Poverty administrators, the
shift in emphasis was understandable. As Moynihan lamented, "Some of
the public—or at least Congress, and painful to state, the White
House—associate [civil disorders] with the poverty program, which
began its community action work at just about the time the communities
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became violent." Congress and the President, in effect, said to
0E0, "You caused all these riots; now you stop them."^
In preparing the Summer 1966 proposal for Washington, Westside
was well aware of the riot-prevention role they would be put into. The
proposal pointed out the poverty concentration of non-whites and the
high percentage of youths in the area around the Center. "The area
of the city has also, it added, "been prone to racial tensions and
flare-ups
Directors of poverty agencies chose some compromise role.
More than most officials, they knew that trash fires and vandalism
in schools and mass confrontations with policemen on busy streets
created pressure for change. The unpublicized figures showing low
reading scores in black schools, by contrast, tended to justify the
status quo. Yet violence and vandalism, however effective as protests,
had no connected end product. Those bright and alienated youths who
found themselves labeled as chronic discipline problems could not
convince educators that schools—with their indifference and bigoted
teachers and inappropriate curriculum—had failed them. Similarly,
the shouts from a crowd toward police officers making an arrest scarcely
convinced the police chief that his men needed training in sensitivity.
Accordingly, poverty agencies, including Westside, had an
13. Moynihan, On Understanding Poverty , p. 16.
14. See the Westside Study Center Master Proposal in the official
files of the director.
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extremely difficult role unless OEO supported them with awareness and
care. Yet OEO seemed more at home with the pretentious condescension
of the civil rights movement than the threats of urban violence which
followed Watts. In order to qualify for funds, Westslde had to
stress the powerlessness and potential for violence in Northwest
Pasadena while proposing middle class ways for ameliorating those
conditions. Phrased more directly, Westside staff knew that the
fires in Watts had hastened federal funds for Los Angeles and the
accompanying disorders along Fair Oaks Avenue during that August 1965
had made Pasadena a candidate for funds. At the same time, they
had to hold out a promise of preventing rioting in the future.
For Westside, its disillusion with the War on Poverty in the
Summer 1966 funding was more than merely philosophical. The "summer
crash" program for Westside promised funds by mid-June; or at least
the Director was to have hired a staff of approximately one hundred,
including about sixty part time aides
,
by then. Yet the first federal
money did not come through until the end of July. Somehow administrators
of community organizations were supposed to explain to hard core youths
why pay checks were not available—and make them believe Washington
knew about ghetto problems and cared enough to change them.
As the Director commented in October, 1967, before the Ad
Hoc Sub-Committee on Los Angeles Economic Act Program of the United
States Congress, Washington's community action deserved "a mixed
judgment." President Johnson’s proposal had aroused hope. It had
motivated people to try. Yet the money had gone into traditional and
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"safe" programs and agencies, while virtually ignoring all real
community action. "To date," the Director noted, "the level of
promises and excuses has far exceeded its fulfillment. The money has
never approached needed levels, with a result that politically safe
or trivial uses of funds have predominated over more effective and
15innovative programs."
The failure of the War on Poverty above all demonstrated the
credibility gap between the power structure and the powerless. City
bureaucrats did not know how to recognize community leaders
,
even when
they honestly looked for them. They could not distinguish between
community-backed organizations and paper organizations. Those few
who did possess the political acumen and racial understanding to
recognize potential power in the poor communities often used that
knowledge to 'defend themselves against change. Organizations that
had the potential for significant action were the least likely to
be funded. >
Indicative of these weaknesses, by ignorance or design, was
the fact that huge sums of money went to the administrative costs
of various programs, with a small per centage reaching poor people.
Westside ran into this reality first hand in the funding of their
Summer 1966 program. Part of the late funds came through in July.
In October, Westside met with the 0E0 funding agency, EYOA, to discuss
15. From the testimony of Atron A. Gentry before the United States
Congressional Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Los Angeles Economic Act Program,
October, 1964.
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receiving the rest of the funds. EYOA explained to Westside that
since the funds had not been spent by September 30, they were no
longer available. Typical of other funding agencies, EYOA had come
upon some useful "discretionary funds" at the expense of the organi-
zation originally funded.
That day in October held symbolic importance for Westside.
Its Director had filed that morning for another year’s leave of absence
from the Army Corps of Engineers. By the end of that day, Westside
was back where it started—standing on its own feet and broke. In
repeated attempts thereafter to obtain federal support from the
poverty program, Westside met with similar disillusion. Its job
development component was funded for two successive summers and for
one follow up program, but as a full time community action organization,
Westside got no support from Washington.
Westside was then primed to operate as an organization by the
same philosophy it proposed for individuals. Self help now meant for
Westside self sufficiency. The War on Poverty had taught Westside
professional sophistication about federal funding. It realized, just
as it taught tutees and job seekers, that the only reliable support
is that which you cultivate, consolidate, and maintain yourself.
4. Westside and the Pasadena Business Community
Community action defined from Washington became an artificial
creation. City officials, representatives from a host of ostensibly
public service organizations , and a handful of poverty
representatives
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came together not because they wanted to fight poverty but to fight
over control of federal funds. In that power struggle those groups
who got on the inside track had all the advantages-witnessed by the
continuing relationship between the Los Angeles School Board and
EYOA. Poor people and new organizations, such as Westside had been in
1966, simply had nothing to trade with established community groups.
After a time 0E0 officials became very frank that no local
group could get funds unless it had "clout," which meant political
support, usually in Congress. Cut off by Johnson soon after its
inception, 0E0 operated from top to bottom on the basis of trading its
money for political support. Organizations which might actually do
something for poor persons, and thus might demonstrate the carelessness
and bigotry of most agencies, threatened local power structures. By
requiring a negotiation in political support, 0E0 condemned itself to
dealing with safe programs such as Head Start or politically accepted
groups, rather than with groups like Westside.
At times Westside had a negative clout in Pasadena’s Community
Action Agency because it did too much for too little money and seemed
too little responsive to established powers in Pasadena. The evaluation
of Westside' s "Late-Start" Proposal by the Pasadena Commission on
Human Needs and opportunities reflected this "negative clout." PCHNO
staff reported: "....this proposed project is far too ambitious in
its nature to be practical. Most of the tutoring is supposed to be
done by volunteers, yet recruitment of volunteers is not explained.
There is no provision for training of tutors, etc. also, the two educa-
tional components are not welded together into one overall package
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project to get people working." It was ironic that PCHNO, knowing
full well Westside's accomplished deeds in its tutoring program,
evaluated a proposal for the expansion of that program in a vacuum. 16
By the end of 1966, Westside saw that it had power, but not
the kind of power that would wield influence with 0E0. Even though
some top officials in 0E0 saw Westside as one of the best programs in
the country, they could only give peripheral support. The pressure
they were under for safe programs with political pay-offs tied their
hands. For example, the Western Regional 0E0 officer insisted that
PCHNO revise their muddled evaluation of Westside's program. But a
fairer evaluation was not enough to assure funding.
For Westside, then, self help meant finding those things which
people wanted and would pay for rather than pursuing some pie-in-the-
sky demands. It meant finding tangible trade-offs with businesses—
preparing people for jobs for which there was a demand and taking the
burden off management for minority group recruitment, training, and
counseling. White businessmen in Pasadena, by 1966, realized they
needed the resources of black Pasadenans to meet employment demands,
especially for semi-skilled labor employed in industries producing for
the war in Viet Nam.
The civil disorders in 1965 and the new rhetoric of government
programs probably also contributed to the sense that the black community
16. Memorandum from the Pasadena Commission on Human Needs and
Opportunities
.
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in Pasadena could no longer be ignored. But local firms faced a
problem of how to set up lines of communication that never existed
before. No Pasadena agency provided that kind of bridge between Blacks
who wanted jobs and local businessmen until Westside, through its
tutoring program, brought Blacks and whites together in an environment
of some understanding.
Westside offered Pasadena business management a vehicle for
communication. Westside could recruit, train, and counsel unemployed
Blacks and help ease the strain between disenfranchized Blacks and the
white power structure. In return, Westside received financial support
and good jobs in which to place trainees.
This kind of trade-off worked well, and Westside by 1969 had
cultivated wide-spread support in the business community and had
placed hundreds of young Blacks in meaningful, open-ended jobs. When
they did well, they encouraged firms to return to Westside for other
recruitment and for counseling and sensitivity services. The lesson
Westside learned about successful negotiation and self help was passed
on through the staff and permeated its job training philosophy. How
could a bitter young Black get and hold a job in the face of racism
and discouragement? He could do it by seeing the process of trade-offs.
Rather than being "the man's boy}' a victim in the game of hiring and
firing, he became his own man, negotiating on his own terms.
The device Westside used in its job training component to
communicate this philosophy of trade-offs and self-confidence was the
" A full-length mirror was set up at the Center."mirror technique.
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Trainees were encouraged to look at themselves through the eyes of
prospective employers, to imagine what they would want to see and
hear. How would an Afro haircut affect them? How would they react
to a business suit? To dark glasses? To a bashful attitude and
mumbled answers? After viewing themselves from the role of an employer,
trainees could plan how to "con” an employer into giving them a job.
Give the employer what he wants to see and hear in return for a job.
The goal, reflecting the goals of Westside in negotiating with white
businesses, was to find a way to trade off.
Building on the mirror technique, Westside staff showed job
trainees how to project a positive approach. They told a trainee to
use his own vernacular and go and con the man out of a job. They
#
put it as a kind of dare, a challenge. Westside had to break the
I
cycle of short-term jobs and fear of getting fired.
A young black man often believed he would get fired sooner or
later. To keep his self-respect and pride, when he knew the supervisor
was going to terminate him, he would try to get fired for being a bad
actor, or not coming to work on time. A self-created situation was
better than suffering the indignity of doing a good job and being cut
loose for being Black.
Thus Westside trained people in a positive approach as a dare:
"I bet you can’t run a game on the employer and con the man out of a
job for a year.” Then a trainee could take the challenge, put on the
role, and become a part of that company. Once he bought a car or
made
a down-payment on a house, he had become a part of the economic
system.
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Businessmen in Pasadena were excited about the trainees
Westside recommended to them, who were sharp, professional, and
positive. Most Pasadena businessmen had not believed that young
black people could be that strong and positive. Businessmen got
interested and started coming around to Westside to see what was
happening. They trusted Westside and would often hire untrained
people, confident that Westside would help with the basic skills and
would keep tabs on the workers' problems. Businessmen understood good
business, and they made money by employing people recommended by the
Center. Companies like Sears and Roebuck, Consolidated Electrodynamics
Corporation, and Electro Optical Systems in Pasadena supported Westside
financially, hired its trainees, and opened new communication with
Northwest residents in response to Westside' s charismatic atmosphere.
As Westside strengthened its support in the business community
through job recruitment, training, and counseling, another kind of
trade-off relationship developed. Businessmen needed tangible evidence
of their concern for the community; Westside needed publicity and
legitimacy in the larger Pasadena community. As a result, Westside
staff participated in various workshops, conferences, and programs
sponsored by Kiwanis Clubs, Rotary Clubs, and other business organiza-
tions, and various business groups came to events sponsored by Westside.
Businessmen came to the Westside jazz festival, spent time helping out
in the Center, and frequently showed up at the weekly
Community Forums,
as speakers or listeners.
When the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
sponsored a
county-wide conference on New Careers, Westside’ s
Director served on
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the planning committee, and Westside staff participated in the conference
along with national figures such as Dr. Arthur Pearl. Businessmen
turned to Westside more and more for leadership in discussing the
problems of racial conflict and poverty in Pasadena and the Los Angeles
area. In return Westside gained legitimacy and some fame for its
o
innovative and successful programs.
Support from the business community proved invaluable to
Westside. It gained financial backing on a broad based, reliable
foundation. Remarkable breakthroughs were gained in the crucial area
of job training and placement. Business gained from Westside a
vital link in communication with Pasadena's black community. Above all,
the black white barrier that immobilized Pasadena on so many other
levels started to break down because of Westside' s skill in sensitizing
white businessmen to the talents and needs of young Blacks in Pasadena.
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CHAPTER IV
A CURRICULUM FOR THE COMMUNITY—EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
The story of Westside Study Center revealed, through a kind
of reverse imprinting, the failures of urban education in America.
Organized in response to a need for a broad range of self help
programs, the Center showed most clearly what had not been done. It
became a crucial learning center for relating the immediate needs of
black children to the larger contexts of Pasadena and the national
commitment to meaningful equality for all citizens.
Pasadena, by the 1960's, exhibited those elements which
characterized urban problems in American cities: its racially
separated schools provided a focal point for the prejudices and
fears of the majority; white families were pulling out, taking with
them support for public education; poverty, unemployment, sub-standard
housing and inadequate public services condemned its ghetto to a
cycle of defeat; hostility and fear between Blacks and whites held
the potential for alienation and violence; and, above all, the failure
of its public schools to meet the needs of black children foreshadowed
an intensification of those problems.
Westside' s programs demonstrated to a wide audience the needs
of Blacks in Pasadena. Each program, each function of Westside evolved
in response to a serious and immediate need. Most important, those
needs had been articulated by staff and supporters of Westside, not by
endless social and economic surveys. On the simplest level, Westside
105
succeeded because of its ability to communicate those failings of
urban education to Pasadenans and, at times, to poverty program
bureaucrats
.
Secondly, Westside' s educational programs demonstrated how
change could come to meet those needs. In a sense, the Center
demonstrated the validity of community schools. But "community
schools" like "community action" rapidly became a slogan filled with
ambiguity. Community schools meant anything from advisory boards with
token parent representation to community control of the kind that
rocked Ocean Hill-Brownsville. The notion of community control became
so politically charged that only extremists survived the fight for it.
Westside, on the other hand, demonstrated that community
control depended upon community caring and community self help. There-
fore, change in urban education was possible without massive intervention,
without multi-million dollar programs and swarms of highly paid experts.
"The culture of poverty," "education for the disadvantaged," or "The
War on Poverty" made little sense at Westside. If teachers cared
enough to teach, if school officials cared enough to insist on equal
education— in other words, if white racism were neutralized—children
would learn in city schools.
Kenneth B. Clark, in an article in the New York Times underlined
the effects of "culture of poverty" euphemisms used to justify bad
teaching:
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The concept of the "culturally disadvantaged" is part of the total
thesis that minority group children suffer from economic, cultural
and political disadvantage and, therefore, cannot be expected to
learn as white children do. This argument, like the theory of
racial inferiority of these children, assumes that since educational
disadvantage reflects more basic disadvantage, one cannot expect the
schools to succeed until the fundamental economic or biological
disadvantage has been removed. This thesis I reject categorically
....[Negro youngsters,] when they are adequately taught. .. also learn.
Clark pointed out the "guise of compassion" that categorized whole
groups of children as inferior "and denied each child, so stereotyped,
his individuality and his potential, thus perpetuating the self-
fulfilling prophecy of massive educational under achievement for all
these children."^- It was Westside’s experience that the brightest
children were most often casualties in the schools’ degrading "guise
of compassion."
Westside's educational program proved those simple facts. Its
tutoring program, its job training program, and its adult education
program all succeeded because of self help, community concern, and
caring. The "hope factor" restored to individuals their dignity,
potential and self-esteem. The conclusions for the field of urban
education were so elementary that it was unlikely they would be
recognized by economic and social experts whose reputation and livelihood
rested on complex solutions for complex problems.
1. The Tutoring Program
The tutoring program was the heart of Westside during its early
1. Kenneth B. Clark, "Answer for ’Disadvantaged’ Is
Effective
Teaching," New York Times , January 12, 1970.
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stages of development. Through tutoring and being tutored, people
from the community learned about the Center as a place to seek help.
Tutoring also provided those who wanted to contribute time and skills
with useful and meaningful tasks. People who joined the program,
caught up in the spirit of Westside, ranged in education from high
school drop-outs to a prominent professor of aeronautical engineering
o
from Caltech.
The founders of Westside knew from their personal experiences
in schools that children, especially boys, reached a confrontation
point around third grade. At that point, the humiliation and defeat
of not being able to read and write began to have very personal and
racial meaning. In the school years that followed, de facto illiteracy
meant failure in most other subjects. By young adulthood, that
humiliation made necessary either aggression, defeat, or an elaborate
pattern of self deception. Most high school graduates in poverty
areas could not read beyond the fifth grade level.
Students who knew they were bright and capable and wanted to
be doctors, lawyers, electricians also knew the bitter truth that
they could not read. Malcolm X’s experience was not unusual—he
entered jail unable to read a newspaper. Compounding that tragedy,
most black parents believed that schools were educating their children.
2. Information on Westside Study Center educational programs
in
Chapter IV is based on the files of the Director, including many
proposals prepared for local and federal funding.
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They wanted their children to read and write because they had lacked
that opportunity. Children in that double bind were programmed for
bitterness and aggression. It was typical that the brightest boys
sst trash fires in the schools, broke windows, and cut classes.
The immediate need Westside served in its tutorial program
was for remedial reading and math, as well as assistance with English
and grammar. Most importantly, Westside developed an incentive to
learn in an environment that was acceptable, informal and relaxed.
Interviews with public school teachers and administrators indicated
that, while some were aware of these needs, formality of structure,
facility and financial shortage, and a communication barrier prevented
a comprehensive, massive attack on the problem.
Again, the founders of Westside looked for solutions to
problems in reading and basic skills from their own experiences.
They had found that phonics helped them. Phonics had the advantage
of being largely oral and could utilize familiar words. Children
could take words apart and relate them through the use of syllables.
The process of repetition could develop new patterns of reading and
spelling and provide the key to learning.
Billy Williams borrowed a few dollars from his boss and
bought some books, and the three founders started meeting on Saturdays
with children Williams had contacted through working at the drug store.
When the founders obtained more information about the failures of
education for Blacks in Pasadena, they decided to expand and rented
an old building from the Elks for $80 per month. Half the windows
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were out and there was no heat. The tutoring program grew—sometimes
a class of forty to fifty met in a nine by twelve foot room.
Parents became involved. They formed a car pool, organized a crafts
program, and provided cookies and juice on Saturdays.
Soon Westside added remedial reading courses and tutorial
assistance in math, social studies, and English. Classes were scheduled
four evenings a week. Weekends were devoted to craft and recreational
activities. A "junior executive" class was conducted on Sundays. The
class was specially directed toward the youngster with leadership
qualities who might otherwise devote time, effort, and ingenuity to
anti-social activities. To make such a leader useful at Westside
was the first st p in allowing him to be useful in society.
The tutoring program extended to resemble a full-fledged
academic program including reading, mathematics, English, humanities,
creative education and science. An early tutoring program proposal
iphasized the following content:
1. Reading 2. Mathematics
Phonetics Elementary math fundamentals
,
Reading Comprehension new math
Spelling Upper Division-algebra,
Language Development geometry, calculus,
Foreign Languages engineering math
3. English 4. Humanities
Syntax and Grammar Social Studies
Vocabulary Civics
History
5. Creative Education
Art 6. Science
Music Individual attention by
Cultural Appreciation graduate students. Con-
ceptual bases of science.
Cross-cultural translation
science- problems.
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The tutorial program began with in-service sessions with the
tutors and the educational coordinators. At those meetings, tutors
discussed the goals of the Center and nature of the problems confronting
the tutees. Guidelines were set up and materials to be used in the
program were explained. Additional in-service training sessions were
held where Westside paraprofessionals exchanged ideas with professional
personnel from local colleges and the Pasadena School System.
Two hundred tutees enrolled in the 1966 summer session, the
greatest number of which were elementary level students. The
elementary children were tutored three days a week—Monday, Wednesday,
and Thursday in morning and afternoon sessions of approximately
forty to fifty minutes each. Tuesday and Wednesday evenings were
allotted to tutees at the high school level. On Tuesdays arts and
crafts teachers from the Girls’ Club of Pasadena came to the Center and
provided a complete program. During the rest of the week crafts and
recreational facilities were available before and after tutoring.
Fridays were designated for field trips which provided the children with
wider cultural experiences.
Data tables from an EYOA evaluation of Westside in November,
1966 provide a profile of the educational aides employed in the tutorial
program. About half were under eighteen, almost evenly divided between
male and female. Three were white, fifty-one were Black, and one was
Mexican-American. Twenty-five had not finished high school, and eight
had completed their first year of college or more. About half came
from families with five or more members; forty-six out of fifty-two
reported family incomes below the federal poverty criterion (see figure 7).
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Questionnaires indicated that aides came to Westside by word
of mouth information. Two- thirds evaluated the program as "Very
valuable," the remainder rating it "Of Some Value." In response to
the question "Do you think that if things go well for you after
this program is over, it will be because the program has helped you
in some way?" Sixty-nine per cent answered "Yes." Over half rated
O
the staff they worked with as "Excellent."
After two and one half years of operation, Westside could
summarize the strengths of its tutoring program: Tutoring was most
successful on a one to one basis. The personal contact and empathy
between tutor and tutee were essential factors in the learning process.
At some time between the third and fifth grades many minority children
were "turned off " about school. Therefore, the tutor’s main
function
was to overcome a lack of trust and to give the tutee a
feeling of
self confidence by showing the tutee that he or she could learn.
At
each meeting tutors emphasized step by step the progress
that a student
made.
Senior and junior high school students enjoyed tutoring
elementary school students; wilh proper training,
they became most
effective tutors . Such a program was already in
operation between
Washington Junior High and Washington Elementary
Schools. In cross-age
,
c Thomas A. Anderson and Harry Krasnick,
"Westside Study
Center Youth Development Program Final
Evaluation Report> “ r
'
„,
,
S Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles, November 1966.
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tutoring, older students learned as well as younger. As the summer
program in 1966 revealed, learning motivation and self confidence of
young people were greatly stimulated by employing them part time as
tutors of younger children.^
Involvement of parents in the tutorial program was an
important factor in the success of such a program. Tutors could work
with tutees on an average of five hours per week. When parents were
involved in the tutoring program, much faster progress was possible.
Westside planned special classes for parents, reading materials for home
use, and information on counseling procedures. Parents’ and citizens'
organizations in the Washington Elementary School area concerned with
education were informed of all components of the program and their
ideas and assistance were welcomed.
The Westside Study Center proposed a comprehensive
training
program for tutors. Starting in February, 1968, twenty
young people
' from the high schools of Pasadena would be
employed as tutor trainees
at $1 per hour for a total of 24 hours over
a three week training
period. After completing their initial
training, each of these tutors
would be assigned to a tutee seeking
help in reading for a period of
ten weeks. During this period the
tutors would spend an average of
five hours a week in tutoring,
at a rate of $1.50 an hour. This rate
4- m effect, Westside had develop*l a Education
=ioi°De«r^ catalog of progrLs for 1970, published
by the U.S. Office of Education.
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would be maintained at that level thereafter. This first thirteen
week period would be followed up by a two week tutor workshop (two
hours each week) , designed to iron out "hang-ups" and problems
experienced by tutors. Then the tutors would be assigned to a second
ten week period.
A consulting staff would consist of ten volunteers, including
professional teachers, student teachers and Caltech professors. This
staff had the assignment of adopting the methods, including phonics
and sight recognition processes, preparing the lesson plans, and
recommending materials for the tutor training program. Along with
some of the experienced tutors , they would conduct tutor training
programs and various workshop sessions. They also would review
the program periodically and prepare proposals for
support by private
and public agencies.
In summary, the purpose of the tutorial
program was not to
supplant but to supplement the work of the
public schools in order
to establish that poor and minority
students could learn. It provided
individual tutoring on a one to one basis
in order to overcome the
principal barrier to the advancement of
minority students-reading
problems. Participating tutors improved
their own reading abilities
and added to their own self
confidence by teaching younger children.
At the same time parents were
closely involved with the education
of
their children and were stimulated
to improve their own reading
abilities and interest in education.
That involvement and interest
helped create pressure on the schools
for better teaching and
compensatory support.
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Westside's tutoring program, in fact, reached far beyond
merely supplementing public school education. The Center provided
a bridge between disenchanted students and school authorities. The
EYOA evaluation described a typical example.
A specific example from the records of Westside Study Center is
that of Roy D.
,
a fifteen-year-old Negro aspiring to be a
medical doctor. Because of Roy's middle-class values and
lower-class background, he was adjudged to be aggressive and
hostile by school personnel, who felt Roy should expect and
accept mediocrity in grades and counseling.
Roy D. was sent to a juvenile detention camp because of his
involvement in setting a trash can fire at a local elementary
school. This has been a serious setback for him in pursuing
his professional career. In subsequent months other school
fires were started in protest to various school policies by
youths with similar frustrations. At this time, Westside
Study Center was able to work with both students and the school
administration to stop turmoil, change school policies, and
reinstate those students expelled during the demonstrations .
5
That incident demonstrated Westside's influence with public
school officials. Westside facilitated communication between parents
and teachers. Often Westside staff provided the key for reconciliation
between a hurt and angry parent and a defensive teacher or administrator.
Elementary school teachers from nearby Washington Elementary began
coming to Westside after school to tutor children. It seemed ironic
yet fitting that teachers in a ghetto school, realizing the failures
of their roles within that school, came to Westside to counteract that
failure.
5. Anderson and Krasnick, "Westside Study Center," p.5.
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2. Job Training
As residents in Northwest Pasadena gained trust in Westside'
s
tutoring services, they turned to the Center for job training and
job development. A 1967 survey of the area around Westside revealed
that more than “four in ten adults had not completed high school j two
in ten had not completed more than an eighth grade education. There
was an obvious desire for self-improvement: nearly half of those
surveyed indicated a "strong interest" in participating in adult
vocational educational programs, if they became available. Among those
already employed, a substantial interest was expressed in opportunities
for job and career advancement if training programs became available.
^
The Westside Study Center saw the need, the direct connection
between education and jobs on the individual and community level, as
well as in light of national trends toward human services which underlay
the New Careers idea. Frequently on a tutorial basis and sometimes
in formal classes taught by volunteers, Westside had helped adults
meet educational requirements for finding and advancing in a job. And
for many students from poor families, the frustration and social pressures
deriving from a lack of spending money aggravated difficulties with
school. Often a part-time job did as much as tutoring to keep young
young people in school and learning.
6. See "Neighborhood Social Diagnostic Survey," prepared in
cooperation with the Community Redevelopment Agency of Pasadena,
April 1967.
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At the community level, Pasadena's vocational and job training
had serious lacks. Its educational system was structured for college
preparation (at least for whites). Caltech, ostensibly a "vocational
institution," preferred boasting of its Nobel laureates to providing
training programs benefiting the local community. Rated as one of
the best in the state, Pasadena City College (PCC) attracted
students who wanted an inexpensive first two years before going on to
UCLA or elsewhere as well as girls who wished to compete for queen of
the Tournament of Roses. ^
As a result of its emphasis upon academic standards, Pasadena
City College often failed to serve its ostensible purpose as a
community service for those who lacked financial resources for a state
college or university. Consequently, PCC had an extremely small black
enrollment while California State College at Los Angeles, although
farther away, had a large enrollment from Pasadena and by 1969 a majority
of its enrollment was from minority groups.
In Pasadena, neither the time, place, attitudes of teachers, or
subject matter encouraged minority group enrollment in vocational prog-
rams. High school and PCC courses in vocational education suffered from
those characteristic problems which have given such programs a bad
7. In 1969 a Caltech student project made clear that job training
for minority workers was not inconsistent with high academic standards
for Caltech; but more to the point, its Jet Propulsion Laboratory
located in Northwest Pasadena ignored the problems of local residents.
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reputation throughout the nation. Training for carpentry or plumbing
was a waste of time as long as tightly-controlled unions kept Blacks
out. Likewise, shops had machines and procedures twenty years out of
date. Furthermore, instructors, emulating their academic colleagues,
were more concerned with failing students than with teaching them.
On the other side, employment services by the state or agencies
such as Urban League also adopted the idea of "qualification" as
prerequisite for job placement. Electronics firms which hired unskilled
assembly line workers at minimal wages had moved to less expensive land
farther east in the San Gabriel Valley. Local firms and Caltech's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, which hired many fairly skilled laborers in
addition to a scientific staff, showed no interest in hiring poor and
minority workers and upgrading them into the skilled category.
Prior to Westside, no organization or company seemed willing
to take the risks of on the job training or vocational preparation
of unskilled laborers. In a form of de facto discrimination, firms
and institutions and agencies felt comfortable servicing only the
skilled workers in Pasadena. The impact of that system of prerequisite
qualification has been well documented. Unless upgrading and on the
job training were built in for minority workers , even those fully
qualified" were reluctant to compete in the hostile high echelons of
private business. Many black college graduates carried mail for the
O
Post Office, where at least they would not be fired.
8. For other examples of self-lowered expectations,
see William H.
Grier and Price M. Cobbs, Black Rage (New York: Bantam Books,
1969),
pp. 109-128.
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Because of those needs for meaningful employment, Westside
Study Center expanded from tutoring to job development and job
training. Its approaches in tutoring and job counseling were similar
whatever one’s age or experience—relate on a one to one basis, build
trust and self confidence and the "hope factor." Soon Westside
incorporated adult basic education, sensitivity training (both for
employers and employees) and vocational training.
The essential step in transforming a hard core, poverty-bound
person into a productive worker was to develop in him a positive
attitude and self image. That change in his entire outlook required
sensitive and extended guidance on an individual basis—a conclusion
which followed from the established failure of standard methods to
reach the hard core unemployed. He had to see himself as a potentially
capable and useful member of a middle class society. He had to learn to
express that new viewpoint so that he could communicate with teachers,
line foremen, and others. Only then would he have the motivation and
adaptability for learning skills and habits which could contribute to
employment and advancement in skill levels
.
The first requisite for such a change, of course, was to hold
a steady job which offered vocational learning experiences and would
not end in a short time. But Westside realized that the best of career
openings would not—by themselves—produce desirable changes in those
persons who had adapted their lives to occasional work and chronic
9
welfare without financial responsibility or pride in accumulated
possessions.
9. For a fine study of the street corner men, see
Elliot Liebow,
Tally’s Corner (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967).
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The second requisite was for counseling—direct
,
personal,
extensive and continued assistance over both vocational and domestic
problems . Often the best counselors were those young men and women
who recently had found their own way from aimless hanging around on
street comers to meaningful employment. Those persons possessed a
rare skill because they were bilingual in a language of inflection
and idiom. They could convey an empathy which could not be counter-
feited. Sometimes inadequate living conditions or transportation
facilities made promptness and neatness difficult. A good counselor
assisted a new employee in finding better quarters and transportation.
Similarly, legal problems or credit delinquencies often required a
time-consuming effort by a counselor before a trainee could concentrate
upon his own vocational training.
A third requisite in the Westside design for getting an
unemployed person ready for training and advancement was basic education.
The ability to read at least up to the fifth grade level was imperative
if training were to succeed. Usually the never-quite-adequate reading
and writing skills of the unemployed all but disappeared in a few
years of idleness following formal education. Trainees needed instruc
tion in reading, arithmetic, and writing that was directed to their
situation and did not repeat methods which failed the first time.
Memorization of addition and subtraction—never much use anyway—was
less important than making clear what it meant to subtract 5/8 or
to multiply by 12 to get every dimension in inches.
All Westside vocational training programs had to be
coordinated
with job openings as well as with existing state and
company programs.
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The training and counseling had to fit the job and the person's
individual needs. Consequently, many programs proceeded on an ad
hoc basis and then were not repeated. For example, some volunteers
from the State Highway Division offered instruction to pass a California
exam for Engineering Aides because they had some openings at that time.
Westside also worked with training nurses aides, a field which seemed
an expanding source of jobs in Northwest Pasadena.
Due to its successful experience with hard core unemployed,
Westside was invited by local firms to sub-contract for counseling
and basic education as part of Manpower Development and Training Act
contracts. Two years after Westside had worked out its ideas for
vocational training, the United States Department of Labor set up a
special contract procedure which "goes beyond conventional 'on-the-job
training programs." The government established a special program
offering "funds to offset the cost of recruiting the disadvantaged,
providing remedial education, counseling, on-the-job training, and
supportive services such as minor medical care and transportation
where needed." 10 In Pasadena, only Westside Study Center could
provide
those services which at last the government had recognized as
essential
for a successful program.
10. Letter to B.W. Cobb, Consolidated Electrodynamics
Corporation,
Pasadena from Stanley Ruttenberg, Manpower Administrator,
United States
Department of Labor, January 9, 1968.
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3. "Late-Start" Adult Education
,
In November of 1967, Westside prepared a comprehensive
program for adult education called "Late-Start." Because of its
reputation in Pasadena, its active job development, and its success
with short term pilot programs, Westside would have no difficulties
in recruiting persons for the program. Increasingly, volunteers had
appeared from the Negro middle class who had a special contribution
to make to the community, but who needed staff time to arrange classes
and counsel both teachers and students. The effort to match abilities
and willingness to help with tutees’ needs in the optimum way took
substantial time. The challenge was to integrate the various activities
and continue a balanced program of adult education through an entire
year.
Westside undertook a comprehensive six-part program for Adult
Education, "Late-Start": The first component focused on training for
improved skills. Westside had worked with fifteen semi-skilled or
unskilled workers who attended classes for five hours each week. Their
immediate objective was to pass the California examinations for a
general education diploma— the high school equivalency degree. The
setting at Westside, close to and familiar to the neighborhood
people
who needed help, provided an atmosphere of optimism about
the place
among the members of the ghetto community which encouraged
self
improvement. Persons who volunteered for such a course were
already
somewhat motivated, and usually their effort was
rewarded with
advancement. That shift allowed room at the bottom
for those with
lower skills.
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Westside proposed expanding that program to five or more
programs per year, offering eight weeks of instruction to twenty persons
at a time. In addition to formal classes taught by professional
teachers in adult education courses, the Center would add personal
tutoring and counseling, open discussions about the difficulties
encountered, and lessons in how to take examinations.
In order to push this segment forward Westside proposed a
full time coordinator, two aides, and some outside consultants who
would advise about ways to speed up the time needed to pass the exams.
The coordinator would counsel and test potential members of the class
and volunteer tutors and instructors, and he would continue that general
oversight throughout the course. Under his direction two part time
aides would learn about teaching while performing routine services
and tutoring.
Finally, in order to allow anyone to take part in the course
who wanted to and also in order to cut down on absenteeism and failure
to complete the course— two problems of particular importance in adult
education—Westside proposed a scholarship of $75 for anyone who
successfully finished eight weeks of instruction. In most cases the
money would be needed for transportation or babysitting costs or books.
A second component, related to the first, was prevocational
training for the unemployed. A pilot effort at Westside involved ten
unemployed adults for an eight week period with fifteen hours of
classes per week, tutoring in general skills such as reading and
writing, instruction in personal behavior, psychological
counseling,
advice about forms and job applications, and so on—all with the
object
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of finding jobs for the long terra unemployed that would not be
"deadend" positions, but would offer long term career opportunities.
Long term unemployed and unemployables were the most serious,
and most visible, community problem. The contagious spirit of self
improvement, the lack of shame in participating in Westside programs,
the example of the staff there, and the personalized effort available
gave Westside special advantages in helping this group who represented
the greatest challenge to adult education programs.
Westside staff would increase the number in the class to
twenty adults, run six such programs during the year, and encourage
additional volunteers and professional instructors to participate. Such
a full time operation would make large demands on both staff and
space,
but turning more than one hundred welfare cases into employed
productive
taxpayers would have a substantial immediate impact upon Pasadena
and
particularly upon other unemployed workers.
In order to develop this part of the program,
Westside called
for a full time coordinator, two assistant
coordinators, four part
time aides, and some outside consultants.
The coordinator would have
primary responsibility for counseling, for
organizing the classes, and
for finding instructors and providing
them with consultant advice. His
assistants would coordinate the program with
the local welfare depart-
ment and with the job development segment
already funded at Westside.
in addition they would supervise and
train the four aides who would
work primarily at tutoring assistance in
order to handle individual
problems outside of a class situation and
keep the group together
as much as possible in the level of
instruction.
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In order to encourage participation in this program, to offer
some incentive without destroying the atmosphere of self help, Westside
proposed to offer scholarships of $120 to anyone who completed the
eight week program. That money would pay for incidental expenses
,
encourage participation, but would not involve a payment large enough
to substitute for a job or welfare.
Thirdly, Westside developed a program of communication improve-
ment for emerging professionals. David Smith, Associate Professor in
English at the California Institute of Technology, spent three hours
each week with the leaders of the Westside Study Center for work on
basic composition skills. Other adults in leadership positions had
asked for such help. Caltech professors in humanities were most
useful for such small discussions with relatively educated students.
The program vjould involve two groups whose participation could augment
the long run success of the Study Center: Caltech faculty and emerging
middle class Negro professionals who typically have become cut off
from ghetto problems just when they achieve a position where they could
contribute importantly.
In the proposed program Caltech professors would volunteer
their time for a twelve week series, three hours per week. Two
groups could meet concurrently with three such series during the
year. Discussion groups limited to five persons would limit total
enrollment to thirty, but the content could be as rich as the groups
wanted.
On a small scale, but crucial to an adult education program
was basic education for functional illiterates. Volunteers had taught
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reading and simple arithmetic to three functional illiterates. The
object was to enable these persons to fulfill their legal obligations
and to survive outside a public institution.
Westside knew many individuals who could be helped if it had
space and materials and sufficient staff to organize volunteers for
this group. Only a few could be taught because the talent and
patience required to achieve success in this program was a rare
commodity. Nevertheless with space and a staff to organize the effort,
Westside hoped to increase the number from three to ten students, with
further expansion limited only by future recruitment of teachers.
A fifth component was advanced tutoring for job advancement.
Caltech professors had worked with individuals who needed training in
electronics
,
mathematics and experience with wiring. Those ad hoc
arrangements among individuals who met at the Study Center were
generally quite successful.. As increasingly complex and skilled jobs
became available in the electronics and space industries of the
Pasadena area, often the best opportunity Blacks had for such jobs was
to advance within the company. When they lacked a particular skill
or
training, specialized tutoring enabled them to gain a promotion
and find
a more satisfactory career.
The Westside Staff, taking advantage of its many contacts
with
college faculty and with local business firms, planned
to work at
both ends to encourage the opportunity for such
advancement. Thus they
could seek to obtain firm pledges of job advances if
certain tutoring
were performed and then match the tutee
with the best available tutor.
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In May, 1968 Westside proposed an additional component to its
"Late-Start" program: coordination and counseling for education.
Because people came to the Center with widely different backgrounds
and abilities, it was crucial that they got into the best program for
their purposes. A forty year old man who finished the sixth grade in
a Mississippi school required vastly different approaches than a
twenty year old clerk-typist who needed a little help with shorthand
in order to keep up in an evening course. Many persons had special needs
or problems which require a tutoring arrangement on a one to one basis.
The first five components described fairly common situations which
resulted in a somewhat organized formula, but that arrangement did not
insure that persons always got placed in the right category.
Westside proposed an education director with overall respon-
sibility for those programs at Westside and with a primary responsibility
to coordinate those programs with the local high schools and with the
Pasadena City College adult education programs. Under him would work
two counselors vhose task would be to work out an individualized
educational program which met the needs of those who sought help and
to arrange for special tutoring when needed. Each would have two part
time aides who would help with counseling, bring a special ability
to
communicate with hard core persons, and learn how to handle the job
themselves. In addition, this segment would have two administrative
secretaries to keep central records for the educational component.
Westside' s "Late-Start" program was a unique combination
of
remedial components and components which would seldom
be found as
part of a typical poverty program. Basic
education and job training
128
for the unemployed were important. But equally important was
communication improvement for emerging professionals. Westside staff
found jobs for the hard core unemployed, but they also encouraged
people to organize a jazz benefit at the civic auditorium, to explore
techniques in basic encounter and to form Black Studies groups.
Westside' s weekly Community Forum best illustrated its impact
in adult education. Each week from fifty to two hundred local community
residents, Pasadena businessmen, and Caltech professors and students
gathered at Westside to hear lectures and panel discussions. The topics
ranged from job opportunities, African history, and black power to the
American Nazi Party, the John Birch Society, and drug abuse. The
Community Forum offered poor people an exposure to ideas and personalities
important to their lives that newspapers and television rarely afforded.
The Long term failures of public schools to educate poor and
minority persons meant that too many adults needed a late start. As
a vehicle for community action and community education, Westside
offered the hope of basic tools to succeed and the dignity of a
wide
range of intellectual concerns. Its adult education
programs reflected
the broadest meaning of self help and self
improvement.
4. A Curriculum for the Community
There was no simple way to add up and assess the
effect and
value of Westside Study Center's educational
programs. The entire
operation for tutoring, job training, and adult
education cost less
than a small elementary school's
non-teaching staff. By any test of
cost-benefit ratio*' the Center brought an
enormous return for its
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budget. But that criterion was almost meaningless. Since both tutors
and tutees came voluntarily, both individuals must have benefited
from their sessions. The social gain from each hard core poverty
youth who found counsel and training for a job more than matched the
cost of a staff member’s salary for a year.
Responding to the failures of Pasadena schools, Westside never
developed into a total school system. Westside kept fewer children
occupied during the school week than did the public school, but then
no truancy laws made anyone come to the Center. Likewise Westside
could not show a regular advance of classes from year to year in
national tests for reading and arithmetic. But then Westside’
s
visitors had already been turned off or declared a failure by the
schools. If Duke did not find enough of a chance at Westside, the
Center at least gave him a better opportunity than had the public
schools
.
Westside’ s successes did not result from some curriculum
package or special method. Tutors often used the textbooks which
students brought from school. Sometimes tutors worked with new
picture and strip take machines which Bell and Howell wanted
tested,
but more often tutors developed their own variation
of phonics and
drills in order to teach reading. Nor did Westside’ s
unprepossessing
buildings and equipment-one building lacked heating in
winter and in
summer its flat roof collected heat—explain why the Center
attracted
more than a thousand visits to its facilities
each week.
Probably the Study Center had some particular
advantages from
its location and timing. Pasadena was in
the process of changing.
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Its black population included many who had moved there for good
schools, and their protests and legal suits kept pressure on the
school board. The staff Lionel Larsuel, Jack Allen, Tommy Moore,
Nate Sims, and many aides such as Duke and John White—had unusual
talents and loyalty. They made Westside succeed despite a lack of
financial support. Public schools had money and a legal mandate to
provide education for everyone. Their failure defined Westside'
s
tasks, and its lessons might encourage and enable the schools to
perform their original function.
In simplest terms Westside succeeded because people wanted
to come. No better test for schools could be devised. A curriculum
centered on the students' needs and desire for knowledge might avoid
the task of enforcing truancy laws. Westside Study Center presented
a non-hostile, non- frightening atmosphere. Noise, disorder, and
difficult questions did not become reasons for disliking kids. Although
many tutees came to find help in passing an exam in the schools, many
continued coming because they enjoyed learning. For tutors and adults
Westside provided an opportunity to learn in their own way.
Obviously Westside did not operate a set program for standard-
ized classes. Center staff had to find out what people wanted when
they came into the building. Some people needed a tutor who could
understand their personal difficulties as well as help in a particular
subject material. Counselors on the staff had to match students needs
and tutors’ abilities, which in some cases proved simple enough
but
in other cases required a search for someone with
special skills.
That individual attention and flexibility
allowed for long or short
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sessions as many times each week as were desired.
Unlike Pasadena's school system, Westside Study Center did not
ignore the feelings and self concepts of black pupils in a predominantly
white system which often acted as though Blacks were invisible. From
its inception, Westside had worked on various approaches to cultural
orientation for Blacks, focusing on black history and the narrower
issues of the relationship of Northwest Pasadena to the rest of the
city. More crucial for its impact, Westside ran innumerable basic
encounter sessions which dealt openly with the feelings of participants.
Most of Westside' s staff became effective facilitators in encounters
which dealt with the sensitive matter of race and bigotry, and at
Western Behavioral Sciences Institute they participated in special
training.
Thus,. all kinds of people came and were involved at Westside.
That was community involvement in which the community was defined,
not arbitrarily, but in terms of those people who found in the Center a
vehicle for their learning. When business leaders and kids saw each
other meeting in the same building, they had to learn something about
each others' problems. Westside' s openness and commitment to people
made it a learning center for the community. The staff became
necessarily students of that community.
Ultimately, then, what Westside created was not an ideal
school but a reflection of what public schools had not done. Westside
would have had no programs if schools based their curriculum on student
needs. Schools should have individualized instruction through smaller groups
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and more flexible scheduling. Schools should have dealt with the
affective domain, if they were to be effective in so-called academic
topics. And schools should have involved the community as more than
some "poverty board" or participants in an after-hours program if
they were to develop programs which met local needs.
H
11. The similarity between Westside’s experience and many
innovations discussed at the School of Education was not pure
coincidence. The author left Westside for the University of
Massachusetts because Dean Dwight Allen made sense in his call
for individualized instruction, differentiated staffing, flexible
scheduling and relevant curriculum.
CHAPTER V
THE WESTSIDE PHILOSOPHY-
DESIGN FOR EDUCATION
The programs developed at Westside Study Center reflected
new trends in the national economy and the educational system. In the
past, entry into the middle class for whites was possible through a
combination of hard work and education, and that upward mobility occurred
often enough to support a widespread belief in self help. Public educa-
tion had served as a major vehicle through which children could increase
status and income. But long and expensive training for a professional
examination had not been necessary when Abraham Lincoln rose from
poverty to become the highest paid lawyer in Illinois.
Few were as successful as Abraham Lincoln, but most Americans
in the nineteenth century found work at least as unskilled laborers.
Even though they had few opportunities for advancement, their children
could attend public schools and advance into more skilled jobs or
perhaps professional positions. In the modern economy, however,
sophisticated machines have replaced unskilled and semi-skilled tasks in
manufacturing, transportation and some office routines. Technological
progress, which has made possible an unprecedentedly high
productivity
for skilled labor, has foreclosed much of the demand
for unskilled labor
Furthermore, educational programs have not adjusted to those new man-
power needs.
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1. New Careers and Human Services
Westside Study Center was based on the concept of New
Careers, developed mainly in the human services. Westside looked to the
human services industries as the area where increasing demand might
provide open ended jobs for residents of Northwest Pasadena. By 1962,
more than four in ten working Americans held white collar occupations
as office workers, store clerks, computer operators, nurses, teachers,
and social workers. Increasingly those jobs required a college degree
as a credential. Hence, poor and minority groups were cut off from the
rapidly growing job markets by a lack of education. Even those who
finished public school were inadequately trained.
1
If the problems of hard core unemployment were to be met, some
new means of access to such jobs would have to be found. Thus New
Careers called for a new status of paraprofessional in such fields as
education and health. As an aide with opportunity for in-service
training, such paraprofessionals could perform useful work and have a
real chance to advance into a growing professional field.
The rationale for a New Careers concept, then, combined tradi-
tional methods of poverty programs with clear trends of manpower
needs
on a national level. In 1965, Arthur Pearl and Frank Riessman
in their
book New Careers for the Poor identified five goals for a
possible
1. For comparative economic statistics on the
United States see
Arnold" B. ttnr^rh, ILS^ and Its Economic Riture_(New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1964).
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major program:
1. A sufficient number of jobs for all persons without work.
2. The jobs to be so defined and distributed that placement
exists for the unskilled and uneducated.
3. The jobs to be permanent and provide opportunity for life-lone
careers. 6
4. An opportunity for the motivated and talented poor to advance
from low-skill entry jobs to any station available to the
more favored members of society.
5. The work to contribute to the well being of society.
2
Based on its past performance, the economy would not automatically
meet those goals; hence a special program was necessary. First, aggregate
demand for labor might well fall short of full employment. As Pearl and
Riessman pointed out, "approximately the same number of persons will be
employed as laborers in 1975 as in 1960—a period in which it is expected
that 20 million workers will enter the labor market." Second, a large
number of poor persons would not have training for anything but unskilled
jobs, which meant that federal job projects might produce no more
socially useful service than leaf-raking.
3
In 1965 Senator Gaylord Nelson and Congressman James Scheuer
sponsored an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act which allocated
$88 million for a New Careers program in 1967 to provide jobs, training
and supportive services for 30,000 to 40,000 persons. The program was
"designed to enable chronically unemployed individuals to secure entry
2. Arthur Pearl and Frank Riessman, New Careers for the Poor : the
Nonprofessional in Human Services (New York: The Free Press, 1965),
p. 2
.
3. Pearl and Riessman, New Careers for the Poor, p.8.
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positions other than as professionals in the public sector of the
economy with built-in experience." Scheuer cited a potential employment
of 1.2 million in health areas and approximately 3 million in education,
urban improvement and welfare. Thus, "a public service employment
training program will have an anti-inflationary impact on the cost of
human services by creating a supply of manpower to keep pace with
increasing demand, while reducing chronic unemployment."^
An effective paraprofessional program had to offer more
than entry jobs with no open-endedness. As Pearl and Riessman emphasized,
"Persons filling entry positions must have latitude for limited advance-
ment without being required to undergo extensive additional training."
Schools, city agencies, and business firms should develop new positions
with an intermediate status between an unskilled entry position and a
terminal professional status. A career lattice could base advancement
on accumulated service, on the job training, increased educational
experience, along with talent and expertise in the field. Aides trained
in education might progress through a career lattice to full professional
teachers, or they might transfer their experience to related fields such
as counseling, library services, or health services.
^
As Westside Study Center had discovered, a career lattice was
not easily maintained without some important changes in performance
4. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News
(89th Congress, second session, 1966), p.4279.
5. Pearl and Riessman, New Careers for the Poor , p.13.
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expectations. Aides, assistants, and component directors needed time
off for their own education and they often needed special counseling
and help as they attempted work beyond their supposed training and
capabilities. At the same time, Westside perennially demonstrated that
such paraprofessionals often did a better job by relying upon their own
thoughts rather than someone's lectures or books. The mirror technique,
for example, sounded awkward when described but it worked in practice.
^
As long as unemployment existed as one of the salient facts
about America's urban ghettos and as long as there was work of social
importance, then rational policy indicated that the government should
provide the machinery and procedures connecting that labor pool and
those manpower requirements. Education, of increasing importance for
economic growth as well as for an individual's job opportunities, seemed
the key to the entire program. Although taxpayers had raised their
expenditures from $300 per pupil in 1950 to more than $600 by 1968
(measured in constant dollars), school boards and teachers said more
money was needed for a quality education. The extensive use of aides
was a legitimate way to improve the learning opportunities in a
classroom without an unsupportable rise in taxes and bond issues. 7
6. For evidence about the difficulties of new careers in
Community Action Agencies, see Frederick Aheam, "Correlates of Job
Status Among Indigenous Nonprofessionals in Community Action Programs,"
Social Science Quarterly , 50 (December, 1969), pp. 668-75.
7. Per pupil expenditure statistics from the "Digest of Educational
Statistics," (1968), table 76, p.62.
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In addition, New Careers and human services had several
immediate pay-offs for urban areas. No large segment of the American
population had as high an unemployment rate as did young black males
in urban areas. In Pasadena, that rate often stood above 20 per cent
while the national average was 25 per cent. As the largest gap between
the promises of the American social system and its performance,
unemployment was a major source for unrest and bitterness and a host
of related symptoms which made up the pathology of American ghettos.
Repeatedly in the 1960's that social "problem11 became social violence.
The real loss was not in burned buildings or police arrests but in all
the Dukes who never had a chance for productive lives.
As an idea and a program, New Careers offered more than merely
another remedy to "poverty problems." Unlike most ghetto programs which
aimed at raising some "target population" above a legally defined
poverty level, the Nelson-Scheuer Amendment provided a chance for hard
£q£0 unemployed to develop a career and a professional status. Thus,
New Careers provided a link between the problems of a ghetto and current
economic and social trends. The relevant framework for a community
action agency became not a bibliography on the pathology of the ghetto
but an understanding of modern American society.
New Careers, therefore, offered some exciting
possibilities for
counteracting the dehumanizing forces of mass society-huge city
complexes, bland suburban sameness, the impersonality of
large companies,
and the growing discrepancy between institutional
powers and individual
powers. Those forces, when combined with the
breakdown of traditional
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human service institutions such as families and churches, have left
most Americans, rich and poor, without a strong sense of
significance. The need for human services to facilitate communication
and to restore to individuals a sense of importance and of possible meaning
in their lives becomes imperative in light of a shrinking world community.
Indeed, paraprofessionals in education, health, and social
services might restore a more personal kind of human relationship to
work which had become increasingly dominated by impersonal professional
attitudes. People were processed by number so that machines would
do the work; and teachers, nurses, welfare workers, and a host of others
who dealt with people in their work seemed to have no time to see and
deal with a unique individual. Schools ranked students into various
tracks within the school on the basis of some composite score which
ignored their mixture of skills, talents, and possible contributions.
Ideally, aides in the classroom might offer small-group instruction,
provide counseling for individuals who were frightened by the professional
teacher, and allow the teacher more time to learn with students on an
individual basis.
Westside Study Center's New Careers program in human services
applied not only to its own staff and programs but also to many others
in the Pasadena Community. Middle class housewives whose daily routines
had lost meaning found something important for themselves in tutoring
young children. University professors, seeking an outlet for humani-
tarian urges, found fulfillment at Westside. Business men who needed
labor and felt frightened by racial misunderstanding found ways to
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communicate through Westside's help. To a large degree because its
New Careers approach did not require professional skills, Westside
provided an important focal point for Pasadenans who wanted to do
something about their city but did not know how.
2. The Failure of Schools
The failure of schools to grasp those changes in manpower
needs and human needs largely justified their critics' charges that
they operated out of a nineteenth century perspective. At a time when
automation has eliminated many low skilled jobs, public schools have
not begun to educate for skilled and professional work. Urban schools
have failed to graduate as many as 88 per cent of black and other
minority students and have neglected to educate even those who have
gotten a degree. For poor and minority groups, inadequate education
has meant not hard work for low wages but no work at all. Those who
have advised Blacks to go to school, work hard, and get ahead have
not grasped the changed nature of contemporary society.
Instead of responding to a broad perspective of backgrounds
and experiences among their pupils, schools have
clung to "academic
standards" and a liberal arts curriculum designed to
bolster Iowa
Achievement and SAT scores for the sons and daughters
of the white
middle class. Rather than destroying the self
concepts of black
children with a curriculum directed toward Dick and
Jane and Stanford
University, urban schools would be better off
spending their budgets
j
for basketball courts and films. But better
still, schools could
design a curriculum which related to the
lives and needs of children,
-
_
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whether their parents happened to be poor or Black or Mexican American
O
or anything else other than white middle class and suburban.
Symptomatic of a misguided school policy has been the failure
of schools with a substantial minority enrollment to introduce black
history into their curriculum. A report to the California State
Department of Education by six distinguished historians in 1964
analyzed the six major California texts for American history and
found "the virtual omission of the Negro." Black children read text
books designed to sell to white Southerners, which ignored important
Negro contributions, portrayed slavery in benevolent terms, under-
played slave rebellions, falsified the experience of Reconstruction,
omitted the long twentieth century story of segregation and anti-
black violence, and slighted the importance of the civil rights move-
ment. Worse 3till, a false story has been portrayed of Blacks to
white (and black) Americans. Uncle Tom*
s
Cabin, Gone With the Wind
,
and Tarzan movies put over a stereotype of black history which was
9
never contradicted in most classrooms.
8. For further discussion on the relation of self concept to academic
achievement, see E. Blake Jr., "Color Prejudice and the Education of Low
Income Negroes in the North and West," Journal of Negro Education, 34 (1965),
pp. 288-98. and Martin Deutsch, "Minority Group and Class
Status as
Related to Social and Personality Factors in Scholastic Achievement,
Society for Applied Anthropology , monograph no. 2, 1960 , pp. 22-26.
9. This paragraph and the following three are based on an article
by Atron A. Gentry and Robert L. Woodbury, "Why Black History,"
New
England Social Studies Bulletin , 26 (Winter, 1969), PP*
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The case for black history for Blacks was as simple as the
need for student centered learning. Much of traditional curriculums
had little significance or meaning for children in America’s ghettos.
Many black children had little respect for themselves or their possibili-
ties for success—or had little left after their school experiences.
When given a chance to read about black inventors, about Othello, about
slaves dying rather than accepting servitude, about black men with
pride and dignity, black children had an altered image of themselves,
their motivation, and their ability to achieve.
If past were past, the consequences of text books which ignored
black history, reading materials which told stories about life in white
frame suburban houses, and teachers who had never experienced nor read
about Blacks would not have such tragic consequences for children. But
since most white Pasadenans believed the civil rights struggle was in
Mississippi and Alabama rather than in Watts, Compton, and Northwest
Pasadena, they could not cope with the national problem of race
relations
Unaware of their past, neither whites nor Blacks could get
a perspective
on their current situation. If the schools
which perpetuated de facto
segregation in Pasadena ignored that issue, how could
bright black
youth trust them to be more honest about the
value of reading and
algebra?
The task of teaching black history, of course,
went beyond
introducing a better text book and a few
paperbound reports by national
commissions to students. The challenge of
offering an effective course
and feelings as well as cognitive or
rational level
involved emotions
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input. The myths and prejudices which form the baggage of most
Americans ' knowledge about race relations involve substantial emotional
hang ups. The development of understanding must be approached in a
manner quite different from introductory biology or economics. Many
racist attitudes were shaped by television, movies, and scattered reading
which were usually not discussed in a classroom. Thus a free atmosphere
was essential in order to discuss the sources of white racism in
America.
As Westside discovered, there were ways to discuss and learn
about personal feelings, attitudes, and sensitivity which creative
teachers could use. Black-white encounter sessions for teachers and
students made discussion possible and fruitful. Role playing techniques
introduced whites to black roles and vice versa. Basic encounter
sessions for teachers, policemen, and social workers did not assure
an attitude change, but they helped to loosen up people so that they
could discuss prejudice—both their own and their reactions to others'.
More than an integrated textbook or more accurate history, that aware-
ness was often the beginning of a daily education in the pervasive
white racism which, as the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
pointed out, "now threaten [s] the future of every American."
The immediate irrelevance of the typical school curriculum for
poor and black children was compounded by the long term irrelevance
of
schooling in today's world. Schools thought they prepared their
graduates
for a meaningful job. Thirty years ago, when few went
to college and
only about half finished high school, that certification
at least assured
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white Americans a starting position in the upper half of society. Now
a school diploma scarcely assures anyone of a place in the middle class.
The knowledge explosion of the past two decades has made the pretense of
Certification based on pre-service training a futile enterprise. In
higher education as well, the same pressures exist. What could academic
certification mean in a profession like sociology when over half the
literature in the field has been written in the last ten years?^
As many states have moved toward open enrollment in institutions
of higher education, the certification process has broken down. While
aware of that anachronism, college students have been caught between
their parents' faith in the economic value of a degree and their
professors' faith in academic standards. Students know better. As
Kenneth Keniston expressed it: "The causes of student protest lie
not only in the psyches of students, but even more in the world we
inhabit. The shameful legacy of racism, America's dubious imperial role
in the world, the inertia and compromises of our universities—these
are the simple facts against which the ethical impulse of the young is
directed.
As Westside had recognized, and as a 1969 Newsweek poll confirmed,
10. One recent study has indicated that more learning experiences
now occur outside classroom than inside. Such programs are conducted by
business, governments, unions, the military services, correspondence
schools, anti-poverty programs, community organizations and instructional
television. See New York Times (March 27, 1970), section C, p.29,
column 6.
11. Kenneth Keniston as quoted in the Saturday Review (June 21, 1969),
p. 79.
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schools had failed to prepare white middle class Americans for the good
life. Of those polled, 46 per cent agreed while 36 per cent disagreed
that their nation had changed for the worse. As for the 1970's, 59
per cent anticipated increased problems. Peter Schrag explained that
increasing disillusion in a Saturday Review article: "We have become
a country of outsiders precisely because the world—at home and
everywhere else—seems no longer manageable. "12
Education had created ideas faster than people could
assimilate them. "If there had ever been a center, a mainstream of
ideas and action," Schrag wrote, "it rested in the belief that things
were manageable, and that all men and all things would participate."
When that seemed no longer possible, people dropped out, and leaders
spoke hollow rhetoric: "We do not end the war, but pretend that it
no longer exists or that is has been forgotten; we do not eliminate
poverty, but disregard it; we do not risk hope that may remain unful-
filled, but take hope away." Racism and bigotry have excluded most of
the poor, especially minorities, from the right to try the American
dream. And for the middle class, the decay of cities, inflation,
racial conflict, and an undeclared war made the rewards of that dream
bitter-sweet.
The poor, who have been denied even the opportunity of
succeeding at education, look upon student unrest at the universities
12. "The Troubled American," Newsweek , (October
6 1969), p. 35; Peter Schrag, "Out of Place in America, Saturday
Review
,
(May 9, 1970). p. 49. Schrag also quoted in next paragraph.
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with understandable cynicism. Yet their experiences in the schools and
the experiences of their children speak to them with immediacy. Schools
face abandonment by rich and poor alike. Public education, if it is
to survive with a major social function, must relate what it does in
classrooms to the live issues and problems of society. In terms of
human lives wasted, urban schools, more than suburban schools, have to
provide a meaningful and useful education for their students.
3. The Hope Factor
The Westside Study Center was a hope factor for Pasadena's
poor people. It served as a vehicle of hope for the "disadvantaged"
poor
—
people whom society deemed untouchable, unteachable, and undesir-
able. Society looked at them as nothing but a burden and a problem.
Black and poor people were treated as if they were not even there, having
nothing—neither brains nor will—and could amount to nothing. Therefore
they would end up with nothing which was counted as a reward by their
society.
Westside Study Center offered self confidence, self determina-
tion, and hope for all people who came there. It denied the necessity
of a college degree before an individual could help himself or
become
involved. No one was turned away who wanted help or who wanted
to
help. The Study Center was over-all an educational
hope factor with
the community as its classroom.
As a self help organization, Westside
Study Center tried to
make people feel meaningful, not only
meaningful to themselves but to
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society. Westside tried to take people from a negative attitude
toward a more positive attitude. The aim of the Center was to let
people go as far as their potential would let them. Westside not
only let people know what their opportunities were, but showed them
that they could move from one area to another.
Westside spread the hope factor to members of the black
community in Pasadena. A youth who had grown up on the block had a range
of four to six blocks. He had limited needs—shoes, an old car, clothes,
and enough money to put gas in the car. It was important to him to
build a "front"—an image of himself held by those on the block. This
youth was blocked in— limited by his environment. He needed to be
provided with new experiences and to expand his needs.
He, like the Dukes and John Whites, had to have tools to deal
with that growth, to realize that he had natural abilities and talents,
and to develop ways to use those qualities for his own benefit. Those
tools and realizations and new needs represented the hope factor for
an individual—hope that he could do something positive with his life
and make a better life for himself and his family. Thus, he could
develop the necessary control over the direction of his life and over
his environment.
Westside’ s programs of education, job development, community
service, and sensitivity training were designed as vehicles for
community members to develop themselves and expand their needs and
experiences. According to the Council of Economic Advisers, poverty
breeds poverty. A poor individual or family has a high
probability
of staying poor. Low incomes carry with them
high risks of illness;
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limitation of mobility; limited access to education, information, and
training. Poor parents cannot give their children the opportunities
for better health and education needed to improve their lot." Most
important, as the Council pointed out, "lack of motivation, hope, and
incentive is a more subtle but no less powerful barrier than lack of
financial means. Thus the cruel legacy of poverty is passed from
parents to children. "13
At the national level, social scientists have found evidence
for little else but a continuous cycle of poverty. But any local
community action organization which talked of nothing but a "cycle
of poverty" or "culture of poverty" destroyed an individual's hope of
trying to help himself. At the national level, the hope factor sounded
naive and overly optimistic. But even the Council of Economic Advisers
recognized hope as "a more subtle but no less powerful barrier" than
poverty itself.
Westside Study Center knew the paradox of the hope factor
—
that it was the only thing that worked for individuals and that it made
no sense as a national program. But in its New Careers concept, in its
tutoring program, in basic encounter sessions, Westside achieved an
"end run" out of the cycle of poverty by creating a link between those
in power and those without power.
Therefore Westside saw itself in terms of national economic
13. "Economic Report of the President, January 1964," quoted in
Miller, Poverty American Style , p.102.
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trends and current changes in the nature of education. It had to know
about Caltech, federal career opportunity programs, manpower needs,
current federal segregation suits, and cybernation. If it limited its
scope and understanding to compensatory education and leaf-raking jobs
for youth, it merely perpetuated the cycle of poverty. Just as New
Careers linked changing manpower needs with the hard core unemployed,
Westside attempted to link its whole educational program to the changing
needs of society.
The reason that schools, poverty programs and city agencies
could not get away with rhetoric about a "cycle of poverty" and "the
disadvantaged" was probably as simple as Lincoln’s faith that "you can't
fool all of the people all of the time." To move above the poverty
level from $3,000 a year to $3,500 still left the poor and Black minorities
powerless relative to society. If schools, poverty agencies and
communities such as Pasadena were to succeed, they had to aim higher.
Westside Study Center knew that, although the idea made little sense
to bureaucrats and academicians, the hope factor worked.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
Chapter I
The description and analysis of the Westside Study Center is
based on the personal and official files which I maintained during my
years as Director of Westside. These files contain approximately five
thousand items including: minutes of the Board of Directors, program
proposals, correspondence, records and documents, evaluation reports
(such as Thomas Anderson and Harry Krasnick, "Westside Study Center
Youth Development Program Final Evaluation Report," [Economic and Youth
Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles, November 1966]), tapes,
films such as "Black Anger," and many newspaper articles from the Los
Angeles Times
,
• the Pasadena Independent Star-News
,
and the Pasadena
Eagle .
An item of particular interest that I have kept in the Westside
files is Pat Sutton's "Duke: A Study in Deviance." Mrs. Sutton, then
a graduate student in sociology at the University of Southern California,
based her paper on extensive interviews with one of Westside' s aides.
For a comparison of the effectiveness and innovativeness of
Westside' s programs in Pasadena, other programs funded through E.Y.O.A.
and P.C.H.N.O. offer relevant material: 1. "The Hut" operated by the
Pasadena Recreation Department; 2. "Backyard Mothers Club" in Pasadena;
3. "Neighborhood Adult Participation Program" in Pasadena and
Los
Angeles; 4. "Haven House" in Pasadena; 5. "Project Head Start" especially
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in Pasadena; 6. "Youth Training and Employment Program (YTEP)" in Los
Angeles; and 7. "Westminster Community Center" in Watts.
Other programs which build on the principle of self help
include: "Operation Bootstrap" in Los Angeles, "Media Fellowship
House" in Media, Pennsylvania, and "South Arsenal Neighborhood Development
Corporation" in Hartford, Connecticut.
Also, comparison with the "HARYOU" program in New York City is
useful. See Dr. Kenneth B. Clark’s description in Dark Ghetto (New
York: Harper Row, 1965) and Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant
War Against Poverty (New York: Harper Row, 1969).
A number of authors have influenced my analysis of Westside and the
self help concept: E.U. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism (New York: Dell
Publishing Co., 1962); Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York:
Bantam Books, 1965); James Farmer, Freedom When? (New York: Random
House, 1965); Paul Jacobs, Prelude to Riot (New York: Random House,
1968) ; Robert Conot, Rivers of Blood , Years of Darkness C New York:
Bantam Books, 1967) ; Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968); Whitney Young, Jr.,
To Be Equal (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); Jerry Cohen and William
Murphy, Burn, Baby, Bum! (New York: Avon Books, 1966); Martin Luther
King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait C. New York: Signet Books, 1963); Martin
Luther King, Jr. , Where We Go From Here ( New York: Bantam Books, 1966).
Other works include: E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family
in the United States , revised and abridged edition (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1966); E. Franklin Frazier, Black
Bourgeoisie (New York: Free Press, 1957); Talcott Parsons and
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Kenneth Clark, editors, The Negro American (Boston: Beacon Press,
1965); Kenneth B. Clark, Prejudice and Your Child (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1955); and William Haddard and G. Douglas Pugh, editors,
Black Economic Development C Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall,
1969).
Chapter II
information on the City of Pasadena has been drawn
from a variety of newspaper articles in the Pasadena Star-News and the
Pasadena Independent Star-News . One recent article that summarizes
the changes that have occurred in Pasadena in the past thirty years
is Dorothy Townsend, "Pasadena's Crown City Image Tarnished," Los
Angeles Times
,
Section B, April 27, 1969.
For a description of Pasadena's economic situation and plans
to meet problems of growth, I have relied upon the work of the
Stanford Research Institute, referred to in the text as Robert W.
Oliver, An Economic Survey of the City of Pasadena (Pasadena, Calif-
ornia: The Pasadena Chamber of Commerce, May 1959).
The discussion of Pasadena's "Pepper Project" rests upon
publications of the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of
Pasadepa, including: the "Redevelopment Plan," the "Industrial Plan,"
and "The Pepper Project Community Newsletter." Two research reports
are used here: one is of a statistical nature, "Neighborhood Social
Diagnostic Survey," prepared by the Community Redevelopment Agency;
the other is a descriptive survey, Ben Magubane and Anthony Ngubo,
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"Report of the Pepper Area Research Project," Pasadena, California;
American Friends Service Committee, September 1965. A critical view
of the "Pepper Project" is presented in a series in The Pasadena Eagle
,
April 19-July 6, 1968.
For an overview of the problems of urban renewal, see studies
in James Q. Wilson, editor, Urban Renewal : The Record and the Controversy
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), and Peter Rossi
and Robert Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal (New York: Free
Press, 1961).
My sources for the politics of the Pasadena City Schools start
chronologically with David Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1951). Hulburd describes a community conflict
over educational issues which resulted in the firing of the super-
intenent of schools and possibly the end of educational progress in
Pasadena. I have relied on Coleman’s case study of Pasadena and
school redistricting contained in James S. Coleman, ejt al , Equality of
Educational Opportunity ( Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1966). I have been aided by reports such as: "Pasadena City
Schools Racial and Ethnic Distritution of Enrollment," Pasadena:
Department of Research, Pasadena City Schools, October 1966;
"Preliminary Report to the Board of Education from the Citizens iask
Force Study Committee on High School Redistricting, February 7, 1967,
and "Report on High School Districting," Pasadena Council
of Parents
and Teachers, May 8, 1967.
For two years I have taught a course on Urban
Community
has dealt with the problems discussed inRelations. This course
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Chapter II as well as similar problems in Springfield, Massachusetts;
New York City; Philadelphia, Pennslyvania
; Temple City, California; and
other cities where I have had an opportunity to discuss community
relations problems with citizens and officials. For a comparison of
school-community relations problems in other cities see Naomi Levine,
Schools in Crisis : Ocean Hill-Brownsville (New York: Popular Library,
1969 ) ; chapters V and VI of Peter Schrag, Village School Downtown
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967 ); David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street
(New York: Random House, 1969 ).
CHAPTER III
An excellent basic source for this chapter has been Charles
Valentine, Culture and Poverty (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1968 ). .
Many writers have written about poverty: Ben Bagdikian,
In the Midst of Plenty (New York: Signet, 1964); David Caplovitz, The
Poor Pay More (New York: The Free Press, 1967); Michael Harrington,
The Other America (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962); John F. Kain,
editor, Race and Poverty (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall, 1969);
Burton A. Weisbroad, editor, The Economics of Poverty : An American
Paradox (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); Herman
P. Miller, editor, Poverty American Style (Belmont, California: Wadsworth
Publishing Co., Inc., 1966 ).
Books and articles on the War on Poverty and community action
include: Kenneth B. Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant War Agains_t
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Poverty (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum
Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: Free Press, 1969); Martin Rein
and S.M. Miller, "The Demonstration Project as a Strategy of Change,"
in Mayer Zald, Organizing for Community Welfare (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1967); Raphael 0. Nystrand, "The Impact of Community Action
Programs upon School Systems, in David Street, editor, Innovations
in Mass Education (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969); Ralph M.
Kramer, Participation of the Poor (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
Hall, 1969); Ralph M. Kramer, editor, Readings in Community Organization
Practice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969); Harry C.
Bredemier, "The Politics of the Poverty Cold War," Urban Affairs Quarterly
,
_3, (June, 1968) ; Daniel P. Moynihan, editor, On Understanding Poverty
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968).
The second section of Chapter III deals with Westside*
s
programs and is based on my personal files on the Westside Study Center.
Included in this material are: Memoranda and directives from the
Office of Economic Opportunity, the Economic and Youth Opportunities
Agency, the Pasadena Commission on Human Needs and Opportunities, and
the U.S. Department of Labor; proposals for funding Westside programs;
evaluative reports; newspaper articles; and my testimony before the
Congressional Sub-Committee on Poverty Programs in Los Angeles.
CHAPTER IV
I have relied on my personal and official files as
Director
of the Westside Study Center in developing this chapter on
educational
programs at Westside. The most pertinent items in the files
are the
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many educational proposals which Westside prepared for various funding
agencies. Evaluative reports in the files include "Westside Study
Center Youth Development Program Final Evaluation Report" prepared
by the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles.
For a comparison of Westside' s educational programs I have
read: the proposal of the South Arsenal Neighborhood Development
Corporation, November, 1969; "Planning for an Urban Community School,"
Springfield (Mass.) Public Schools, July 1968; Nathan Kravetz, "Academic
Excellence in an Inner City Elementary School," The Center for Urban
Education (New York City), 1968; the proposal of the Wilmington, Del.
Public Schools for a "Brandywine Education Center," 1970.
I have also been influenced by books and articles on tutorial
programs, adult education, manpower needs and economic growth, and
encounter groups: Donald Smith, "The Street Is the Community School,"
Education and Urban Society , August, 1969; David J. Fox, Audrey Herr,
Norman Shapiro, "Supportive Training for Inexperienced and New Teachers,"
The Center for Urban Education (New York City), 1969; William F. Haddad
and Douglas Pugh, editors, Black Economic Development (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969); Creative Developments in the Training of
Educational Personnel (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1969); John Holt, How Children Fail (New York: Dell Publishing Co.,
1964); John Holt, How Children Learn (New York: Pitman Publishing Co.,
1967); Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin,
1961) ; Innovation in Education: New Directions
for the American Scho ol,
(New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1968);
Robert Rosenthal,
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Pygmalion in the Classroom (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1968) although Rosenthal's evidence has been challenged, his conclusions
are still correct; David Street, "Educational Change in the Mass Society,"
David Street, editor. Innovation in Mass Education (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1969); Robert Reiff and Frank Riessman, "The Indigenous
Nonprofessional: A Strategy of Change in Community Action and Community
Mental Health Programs," Community Mental Health Journal monograph
series, 1965.
CHAPTER V
I have read extensively in the area of "New Careers" in human
services: Frank Riessman and Arthur Pearl, New Careers for the Poor :
The Nonprofessional in Human Service (New York: Free Press, 1965);
Jacob R. Fishman, et al , New Careers for the Disadvantaged in Human
Services (Washington: Howard University, 1968) ; Garda W. Bowman and
Gordon J. Klopf
,
New Careers and Roles in the American School (New York:
Bank Street College of Education, 1967); Youth Tutoring Youth (New York:
National Commission on Resources for Youth, 1968); Timothy Leggatt,
"The Use of Nonprofessionals in Large-City Systems," David Street
editor, Innovation in Mass Education (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1969); Dwight W. Allen and Lloyd Kline, Dif ferentiated Staffing,
University of Massahcusetts , 1969.
From the point of view of a non-professional person dealing
with the failure of urban schools, I found Carl Rogers useful and to the
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point; especially On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961);
and Freedom to Learn (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Publishing Co., 1969).
ABSTRACT
The Growth of the Westside Study Center, 1965-1968 (June, 1970)
Atron A. Gentry, B.A.
,
California State College
at Los Angeles
Directed by: Dr. Robert L. Woodbury
The Westside Study Center was a community self help organi-
zation directed toward innovative responses to the failures of
urban education. Founded in 1965 by young black men in the North-
west area of Pasadena, California, the Center began as a tutoring
program and expanded, during the years 1965-1968, into a full-
fledged community action organization embracing education, job
training and development, community services, and public rela-
tions. The Center operated on a New Careers basis—as staff
developed skills, they moved to positions of more responsibility.
The staff were paraprofessionals
,
whose jobs involved both teaching
and learning. Westside’ s success answered the question of whether
an institution might serve as a vehicle for many persons to learn
and succeed in a society marked by racism and economic competition.
The story of Westside Study Center presents an analysis of
urban community relations. The Center existed only because of the
failure of Pasadena to provide equal education, housing, community
services, and job opportunities for its black citizens. De facto
segregation in the schools, combined with inadequate facilities
- 2-
and indifferent teachers and administrators, left black children
without the skills and the self confidence to compete in Pasadena.
Racism and failure to deal constructively with urban problems were
not unique to Pasadena. On the contrary, Pasadena resembled many
medium sized American cities in its political, social and educa-
tional structures.
While the Westside Study Center developed its programs in
Northwest Pasadena, the federal government launched its War on
Poverty based on community action and "maximum feasible participa-
tion" of the poor. After Watts, in the face of increased political
pressure, the War on Poverty’s concept of community action came more
to resemble community inaction and riot prevention. Westside
demonstrated that self help and community caring was more successful
and less contradictory than the War on Poverty's so-called community
action.
Westside Study Center developed extensive programs in educa-
tion, job training and job development, and adult education. In
each program, interaction on a one to one basis, establishing trust
and self confidence, and the New Careers concept of upward mobility
were basic ingredients. The Center broadened its base of support
as its programs for "disadvantaged" Blacks in the community attracted
the support and participation of many white students, educators,
businessmen, and politicians in Pasadena at large.
The key to Westside Study Center's impact in Pasadena was
- 3-
in Providing the "hope factor." Westside convinced both those
in power and out of power, both the advantaged and the disadvan-
taged, that they could realize their potential and become change
agents in their society. The success of the "hope factor" and
Westside Study Center’s programs suggests new alternatives for
urban community relations, racial conflict, and urban education.

